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1. Introduction 
Consumption  growth  covaries  only  weakly  with  equity  returns,  which 
seems  to imply that equities  are not very risky. However,  investors  have 
historically  received  a  very  large  premium  for  holding  equities.  For 
twenty  years,  economists  have  asked  why  an asset  with  little apparent 
risk has such a large required return.1 
Grossman  and  Laroque  (1990)  argued  that  adjustment  costs  might 
answer  the  equity-premium  puzzle.  If it is costly  to change  consump- 
tion,  households  will  not  respond  instantaneously  to changes  in asset 
prices. Instead,  consumption  will adjust with a lag, explaining  why  con- 
sumption  growth  covaries  only  weakly  with  current equity  returns.  In 
Grossman  and  Laroque's  framework,  equities  are risky, but  that  riski- 
ness  does  not show  up in a high  contemporaneous  correlation between 
consumption  growth  and  equity  returns.  The comovement  is only  ob- 
servable in the long run. 
Lynch (1996) and Marshall and Parekh (1999) have simulated  discrete- 
time  delayed-adjustment  models  and  demonstrated  that these  models 
can potentially  explain  the equity-premium  puzzle.2  In light of the com- 
plexity  of these  models,  both sets of authors used  numerical  simulations. 
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1. For the intellectual  history of this puzzle, see Rubinstein (1976),  Lucas (1978), Shiller 
(1982), Hansen and Singleton (1983), Mehra and Prescott (1985), and Hansen and 
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We propose  a continuous-time  generalization  of Lynch's (1996) model. 
Our  extension  provides  two  new  sets  of  results.  First, our  analysis  is 
analytically  tractable; we  derive  a complete  analytic  characterization  of 
the  model's  dynamic  properties.  Second,  our  continuous-time  frame- 
work  generates  effects  that  are  up  to  six  times  larger  than  those  in 
discrete-time  models. 
We analyze  an  economy  composed  of  consumers  who  update  their 
consumption  every  D (as in "delay") periods.  Such delays  may be moti- 
vated  by  decision  costs,  attention  allocation  costs,  and/or  mental  ac- 
counts.3  The  core  of  the  paper  describes  the  consequences  of  such 
delays.  In addition,  we  derive  a sensible  value of D based  on a decision- 
cost framework. 
The 6D bias is our key result. Using  data from our economy,  an econo- 
metrician estimating  the coefficient of relative risk aversion  (CRRA) from 
the consumption  Euler equation  would  generate  a multiplicative  CRRA 
bias of 6D. For example,  if agents  adjust their consumption  every  D = 4 
quarters, and the econometrician  uses  quarterly aggregates  in his analy- 
sis,  the  imputed  coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion  will  be  24  times 
greater than  the  true value.  Once  we  take account  of this  6D bias,  the 
Euler-equation  tests  are  unable  to  reject  the  standard  consumption 
model.  High  equity  returns  and  associated  violations  of  the  Hansen- 
Jagannathan (1991) bounds  cease  to be puzzles. 
The basic intuition  for this result is quite simple.  If households  adjust 
their consumption  every D  -  1 periods,  then on average only 1/D house- 
holds  will adjust each period.  Consider  only  the households  that adjust 
during  the  current  period,  and  assume  that  these  households  adjust 
consumption  at dates  spread  uniformly  over the period.  Normalize  the 
timing so the current period is the time interval [0, 1]. When a household 
adjusts at time i E [0, 1], it can only respond  to equity  returns that have 
already been  realized by time i. Hence,  the household  can only respond 
to fraction  i of within-period  equity  returns.  Moreover,  the household 
that  adjusts  at time  i can only  change  consumption  for the  remainder 
of the period.  Hence,  only a fraction 1 -  i of this period's  consumption  is 
affected  by the change  at time i. On average the households  that adjust 
during  the  current period  display  a covariance  between  equity  returns 
and consumption  growth  that is biased  down  by factor 
1  1 
i(1 -  i)di  = -  . 
6 
3. See Gabaix and Laibson (2000b) for a discussion  of decision  costs and attention allocation 
costs.  See Thaler (1992) for a discussion  of mental accounts. The  6D Bias  and  the  Equity-Premium  Puzzle  *  259 
The integral  is taken from 0 to 1 to average  over  the uniformly  distrib- 
uted  adjustment  times. 
Since  only  a fraction  1/D of households  adjust  in the  first place,  the 
aggregate covariance between  equity returns and consumption  growth is 
approximately  6 X 1/D as large as it would  be if all households  adjusted 
instantaneously.  The  Euler  equation  for the  instantaneous-adjustment 
model  implies  that  the  coefficient  of relative  risk aversion  is inversely 
related  to  the  covariance  between  equity  returns  and  consumption 
growth.  If an  econometrician  used  this  Euler  equation  to  impute  the 
coefficient  of relative  risk aversion,  and he  used  data from our delayed 
adjustment  economy,  he would  impute  a coefficient of relative risk aver- 
sion that was  6D times  too large. 
In Section 2 we describe our formal model,  motivate  our assumptions, 
and present  our key analytic finding.  In Section 2.2 we provide  a heuris- 
tic  proof  of  our  results  for  the  case  D  -  1.  In  Section  3  we  present 
additional  results that characterize the dynamic  properties  of our model 
economy.  In Section  4 we  close  our framework  by describing  how  D is 
chosen.  In Section  5 we  consider  the  consequences  of  our  model  for 
macroeconomics  and finance.  In Section 6 we discuss  empirical evidence 
that supports  the Lynch (1996) model  and our generalization.  The model 
matches  most  of the empirical moments  of aggregate  consumption  and 
equity  returns,  including  a new  test which  confirms  the  6D prediction 
that the covariance between  ln(Ct+h/Ct)  and Rt+1  should slowly  rise with h. 
In Section  7 we  conclude. 
2. Model  and  Key  Result 
Our framework  is a synthesis  of ideas  from the continuous-time  model 
of Merton (1969) and the discrete-time  model  of Lynch (1996). In essence 
we  adopt  Merton's  continuous-time  modeling  approach  and  Lynch's 
emphasis  on delayed  adjustment.4 
We assume  that the economy  has two linear production  technologies:  a 
risk-free technology  and a risky technology  (i.e.,  equities).  The risk-free 
technology  has instantaneous  return r. The returns from the risky tech- 
nology  follow  a geometric  diffusion  process  with  expected  return r +  7r 
and standard deviation  a. 
We assume  that  consumers  hold  two  accounts:  a checking  account 
and a balanced  mutual fund.  A consumer's  checking  account is used  for 
day-to-day  consumption,  and this account holds  only the risk-free asset. 
4. See Calvo (1983), Fischer (1977), and Taylor (1979) for earlier examples  of delayed  adjust- 
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The mutual  fund is used  to replenish  the checking  account from time to 
time.  The mutual  fund  is professionally  managed  and  is continuously 
rebalanced  so that a share 0 of the mutual-fund  assets  is always  invested 
in  the  risky  asset.5  The  consumer  is  able  to  pick  0.6 In  practice,  the 
consumer  picks  a mutual  fund  that maintains  the consumer's  preferred 
value  of 0. We call 0 the equity  share (in the mutual  fund). 
Every D periods,  the consumer  looks  at her mutual  fund  and decides 
how  much  wealth  to  withdraw  from  it to  deposit  in her  checking  ac- 
count.  Between  withdrawal  periods-i.e.,  from withdrawal  date t to the 
next  withdrawal  date  t +  D-the  consumer  spends  from her checking 
account  and does  not monitor her mutual fund.  For now  we take D to be 
exogenous.  Following  a conceptual  approach  taken  in Duffie  and  Sun 
(1990), we  later calibrate D with  a decision-cost  model  (see  Section  4). 
Alternatively,  D can be motivated  with a mental-accounting  model  of the 
type proposed  by Thaler (1992). 
Finally,  we  assume  that  consumers  have  isoelastic  preferences  and 
exponential  discount  functions: 
C?  s  1'  -  1 
Uit =  Et  e-Pp(s t)( c1  ds. 
=t  1 -  y 
Here i indexes  the individual  consumer  and t indexes  time. 
We adopt  the  following  notation.  Let wt represent  the  wealth  in the 
mutual fund at date t. Between withdrawal  dates, wit  evolves  according to 
dwit = wit[(r +  07T)  dt +  0o dzt], 
where  zt is  a  Wiener  process.  We  can  now  characterize  the  optimal 
choices  of our consumer.  We describe  each date at which  the consumer 
monitors-and  in equilibrium  withdraws  from-her  mutual  fund  as a 
reset date. Formal proofs  of all results are provided  in the appendix. 
PROPOSITION  1  On the equilibrium  path, thefollowing properties  hold: 
1. Between reset dates, consumption  grows at a fixed rate (1/y)(r -  p). 
2.  The balance in  the checking account just  after a reset date equals the net 
present value (NPV) of consumption between reset dates, where the NPV is 
taken  with the risk-free  rate. 
5. This assumption  can be relaxed without  significantly  changing  the quantitative  results. 
In particular, the consumer  could buy assets  in separate accounts  without  any instanta- 
neous  rebalancing. 
6. The fact that  0 does  not  vary once  it is chosen  is optimal  from the  perspective  of the 
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3. At  reset date r, consumption is ci+ =  awil-,  where a  is a function of the 
technology  parameters,  preference  parameters,  and D. 
4. The equity share in the mutualfund is 
IT 
0  2  (1) 
Here ci+ represents  consumption  immediately  after reset, and wi,- rep- 
resents  wealth  in the mutual fund immediately  before reset. 
Claim 1 follows  from the property that between  reset dates the rate of 
return to marginal savings  is fixed and equal to r. So between  reset dates 
the  consumption  path  grows  at  the  rate  derived  in  Ramsey's  (1928) 
original deterministic  growth  model: 
c  1 
- =  -(r  -  p). 
c  y 
Claim 2 reflects the advantages  of holding  wealth in the balanced mutual 
fund.  Instantaneous  rebalancing  of this fund  makes  it optimal  to store 
"extra" wealth-i.e.,  wealth  that  is  not  needed  for  consumption  be- 
tween  now  and the next reset date-in  the mutual fund. So the checking 
account  is  exhausted  between  reset  dates.  Claim  3  follows  from  the 
homotheticity  of preferences.  Claim 4 implies  that  the  equity  share  is 
equal  to the  same  equity  share  derived  by Merton  (1969) in his  instan- 
taneous-adjustment  model.  This exact equivalence  is special to our insti- 
tutional assumptions,  but approximate  equivalence  is a general property 
of models  of delayed  adjustment  (see Rogers, 2001, for numerical exam- 
ples  in a related model).  Note  that the equity  share is increasing  in the 
equity  premium  (7r) and  decreasing  in  the  coefficient  of  relative  risk 
aversion  (y) and the variance of equity  returns (u,2). 
Combining  claims  1-3  implies  that the optimal  consumption  path be- 
tween  date  rand  date  r + D is cit =  aee(1/Y)(r-P)(t-  3Wi  - and  the  optimal  balance 
in the checking  account just after reset date r is 
r+D  ++D 
ise r(s  r)ds  = J  ael/)(r-p)(s  )-r(s  -)  W  -ds. 
Claim 3 implies  that  at reset  dates  optimal  consumption  is linear  in 
wealth.  The actual value of the propensity  to consume,  a, does not matter 
for the results that follow.  Any linear rule-e.g.,  linear rules of thumb- 262 *  GABAIX & LAIBSON 
will suffice. In practice, the optimal value of a in our model will be close to 
the optimal  marginal propensity  to consume  derived by Merton, 
ar=  +  1  )  r+ 
y  y/  \  2ya2 
Merton's value  is exactly optimal  in our framework when  D  = 0. 
2.1 OUR KEY  RESULT:  THE  6D BIAS 
In our economy,  each agent resets consumption  at intervals of D units of 
time.  Agents  are indexed  by  their reset  time  i E  [0,D).  Agent  i resets 
consumption  at dates {i, i +  D, i + 2D,  . . . }. 
We  assume  that  the  consumption  reset  times  are  distributed  uni- 
formly.7 More  formally,  there  exists  a continuum  of consumers  whose 
reset indexes  i are distributed uniformly  over [0, D). So the proportion  of 
agents  resetting  their consumption  in any time interval of length  At <  D 
is At/D. 
To fix ideas,  suppose  that the unit of time is a quarter of the calendar 
year, and D =  4. In other words,  the span  of time from t to t +  1 is one 
quarter of a year. Since D = 4, each consumer  will adjust her consump- 
tion  once  every  four  quarters.  We will  often  choose  the  slightly  non- 
intuitive  normalization  that a quarter of the calendar year is one period, 
since  quarterly data constitute  the natural unit of temporal  aggregation 
with  contemporary  macroeconomic  data. 
Call Ct the aggregate  consumption  between  t -  1 and t: 
jD  (jt  c  1 
Ct =  cis  ds)  -  di. 
i=0  =t-1  D 
Note  that ft=t-l cisds  is per-period  consumption  for consumer  i. 
Suppose  that an econometrician  estimates  y and /3 using  a consump- 
tion Euler equation  (i.e.,  the consumption  CAPM). What will the econo- 
metrician infer about preferences? 
THEOREM  2  Consider  an economy  with true coefficient  of relative  risk aversion 
y.  Suppose  an econometrician  estimates the Euler equation 
Et-_1  (  Ct1  t  1 
7. The results change only a little  when we relax  the assumption  of a uniform  distribution. 
Most importantly, if  reset dates were  clumped at the  end  of  periods-a  natural 
assumption-then  the implied bias would be infinite. The  6D Bias  and  the  Equity-Premium  Puzzle  ?  263 
for  two assets: the risk-free bond and the stock market. In other words, the 
econometrician  fits  j8 and y  to match the Euler equation above  for both assets. 
Then the econometrician  will find 
A  6Dy  for  D>  1, 
6i  (2) 
3(1 
6 
)  y  for  O  D<I  l 
3(1 -  D) +  D 
' 
plus higher-order  terms characterized  in subsequent  sections. 
Figure 1 plots  y/y as a function  of D. The formulae  for the cases 0  D  D 
c  1 and D  1 are taken from Theorem  2. 
The two formulae paste at the crossover  point,  D = 1. Convexity  of the 
formula below  D =  1 implies  that y/y  -  6D for all values  of D. The case 
of instantaneous  adjustment  (i.e.,  D =  0) is of immediate  interest,  since 
it has been solved  already by Grossman,  Melino,  and Shiller (1987). With 
D =  0 the only bias arises from time aggregation  of the econometrician's 
data,  not delayed  adjustment  by  consumers.  Grossman,  Melino,  and 
Shiller show  that time aggregation  produces  a bias of y/y  =  2, matching 
our formula for D = 0. 
The most  important  result is the equation  for D >  1,  =  6Dy,  which 
we  call the 6D bias. For example,  if each period  (t to t +  1) is a quarter of 
a calendar year, and consumption  is reset every  D = 4 quarters, then we 
FIGURE  1 RATIO  OF ESTIMATED  y TO TRUE  y 
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get y = 24y. Hence  y is overestimated  by a factor of 24. If consumption  is 
revised  every  5 years,  then  we  have  D  =  20,  and  1  =  120y. 
Reset periods  of 4 quarters or more are not  unreasonable  in practice. 
For an extreme  case,  consider  the  30-year-old  employee  who  accumu- 
lates balances  in a retirement savings  account  [e.g.,  a 401(k)] and fails to 
recognize  any  fungibility  between  these  assets  and  his  preretirement 
consumption.  In this case,  stock-market  returns will affect consumption 
at a considerable  lag (D >  120 quarters for this example). 
However,  such extreme  cases are not necessary  for the points  that we 
wish  to make.  Even with  a delay  of only 4 quarters, the implications  for 
the equity-premium  puzzle  literature are dramatic. With a multiplicative 
bias of 24, econometrically  imputed  coefficients  of relative risk aversion 
of 50 suddenly  appear  quite  reasonable,  since  they  imply  actual coeffi- 
cients of relative risk aversion  of roughly  2. 
In addition,  our results  do not rely on the strong  assumption  that all 
reset rules are time- and not state-contingent.  In Appendix  B we incorpo- 
rate  the  realistic  assumption  that  all  households  adjust  immediately 
when  the equity  market experiences  a large (Poisson)  shock.  In practice, 
such  occasional  state-contingent  adjustments  only  slightly  modify  our 
results. 
Our qualitative results are robust to our assumption  about the uniform 
distribution  of adjustment  dates.  For example,  if adjustment  occurs  at 
the end  (or beginning)  of the quarter, then  the multiplicative  bias in the 
estimated  coefficient of relative risk aversion is infinite, since the continu- 
ous  flow  of consumption  in the current quarter is unaffected  by current 
asset  returns.  By contrast,  if adjustments  occur at exactly the middle  of 
the quarter, then  the multiplicative  bias is 4D,  since the consumers  that 
do adjust can only  respond  to half of the stock returns and their adjust- 
ment only affects half of the consumption  flow  (i.e.  V2  *  /2 =  4). 
We  can  also  compare  the  6D  bias  analytically  with  the  biases  that 
Lynch  (1996) simulates  numerically  in his  original  discrete-time  model. 
In Lynch's  framework,  agents  consume  every  month  and  adjust  their 
portfolio every  T months.  Lynch's econometric  observation  period is the 
union  of F one-month  intervals,  so  D  =  T/F. In Appendix  C we  show 
that when  D-  1 Lynch's framework  generates  a bias which  is bounded 
below  by  D and bounded  above  by 6D.  Specifically,  an econometrician 
who  naively  estimated  the Euler equation  with  data from Lynch's econ- 
omy would  find a bias of 
/  6F2 
-  D  +  higher-order  terms.  (3) 
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Holding  D constant,  the  continuous-time  limit  corresponds  to F --  oo, 
and for this case  A/y  = 6D. The discrete-time  case where agents consume 
at every  econometric  period  corresponds  to F =  1, implying  y/y  =  D, 
which  can be derived  directly. 
Finally,  the  6D  bias  complements  participation  bias  (e.g.,  Vissing, 
2000;  Brav, Constantinides,  and  Geczy,  2000).  If only  a  fraction  s  of 
agents hold a significant  share of their wealth  in equities  (say s = 3), then 
the covariance between  aggregate  consumption  and returns is lower by a 
factor s. As Theorem  8 demonstrates,  this bias combines  multiplicatively 
with  our bias: if there  is limited  participation,  the  econometrician  will 
find the values  of  y in Theorem 2, divided  by s. In particular, for D  -  1, 
he will find 
6D 
=  -  .  (4) 
s 
This formula  puts  together  three  important  biases  generated  by  Euler- 
equation  (and  Hansen-Jagannathan)  tests:  9  will  be  overestimated  be- 
cause  of time  aggregation  and delayed  adjustment  (the 6D factor), and 
because  of limited participation  (the 1/s factor). 
2.2 ARGUMENT  FOR  D >  1 
In this  section  we  present  a heuristic  proof  of  Theorem  2.  A  rigorous 
proof is provided  in Appendix  A. 
Normalize  a generic period to be one unit of time. The econometrician 
observes  the return of the stock market from 0 to 1: 
0'2  1 
InR  =  r +  iT -  2  +  a  dzs,  (5) 
where  r is the risk-free interest  rate,  ir is the equity  premium,  o2 is the 
variance of stock returns,  and z is a Wiener process.  The econometrician 
also observes  aggregate  consumption  over the period: 
C1=  (  cisds  -  di. 
i=o  s=o  D 
As  is well  known,  when  returns  and  consumption  are assumed  to be 
jointly lognormal,  the standard Euler equation  implies  that8 
8. Et_l[P(Ct/Ct_l)- Rt]  =  1 with  R-  = e"a-a/2+2'aa.  The subscripts  and superscripts  a denote 
asset-specific  returns and standard deviations.  As Hansen  and Singleton  (1983) showed, 266 *  GABAIX  & LAIBSON 
7T 
C,  (6)  cov (ln  , In R) 
We will  show  that  when  D  -  1 the  measured  covariance  between 
consumption  growth and stock-market returns, cov(ln[Cl/Co], In R1),  will 
be lower by a factor 6D than the instantaneous  covariance,  cov(d In Ct, d 
In Rt)/dt, that arises in the frictionless  CCAPM. As is well  known,  in the 
frictionless  CCAPM 
cov(d In Ct, d In Rt)/dt 
Assume  that each agent consumes  one unit in period [-1,0].9  So aggre- 
gate consumption  in period  [-1,0]  is also one: Co =  1. Since In (CI/CO)  - 
C1/Co -  1, we  can  write 
cov  In C,  InR,  -  cov(Ci, In R1)  (7) 
cov(Ca,ln R)  di  (8) 
with  Ci1 =  Jf cisds the  time-aggregated  consumption  of  agent  i during 
period  [0,1]. 
First, take the  case  D  =  1. Agent  i E  [0,1) changes  her consumption 
at time  i. For s E  [0,i),  she  has  consumption  cis =  awi,  - e(1/)(r-p)(s-T, where 
= i -  D. 
Throughout  this paper we  use  approximations  to get analytic results. 
Let  =  max(r,p,0 O,r2,  u202, a).  When  we  use  annual  periods,  e will be 
In  + /  ev 
- t  p  - 
2 
+  i  t  -  a  a  a 
If we  evaluate  this expression  for the risk-free asset  and equities,  we  find that 
/  Ct 
Tr  = y  cov  In --  In  lRt  . 
Note  that  7r  +  r =  /,. 
9. This  assumption  need  not  hold  exactly.  Consumption  need  be  unity  only  up  to 
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approximately  0.05.10  For quarterly periods,  e will be approximately  0.01. 
We can express  our approximation  errors in higher-order  terms of &. 
Since consumption  in period  [-1,0]  is normalized  to one,  at time  T 
i -  D, a times wealth  will be equal to 1 plus small corrective terms; more 
formally, 
awi  - = 1+  0<0~  +  0(E), 
awi+  =1  +  0:0(V')  +  0(E). 
Here  O(e)  represents  stochastic  or deterministic  terms  of order  E, and 
0,(Vs)  represents  stochastic  terms that depend  only on equity innova- 
tions that happen  before  time 0. Hence the O<0(V,) terms are all orthogo- 
nal to equity innovations  during period  [0,1]. 
Drawing  together our last two results,  for s E  [0,i), 
ci  e(1/y)(r-p)(s-raw  - 
[1  +  0(e)][1  +  0<,(x/0)  +  0(e)] 
=  1 +  0<o(\/S)  +  0(E). 
Without  loss  of generality,  set z(0) =  0. So consumer  i's mutual  fund 
wealth  at date t =  i- is 
awi,t=i- =  e(r? on-  0'2/2)D+&o[z(i)-z(i-D)l]awi7+ 
=  [1  +  Ooz(i)  +  O<0(,V') +  0(E)][1  +  0<0(V8)  +  0(e)] 
=  1 +  O0z(i) +  O<0(VE  ) +  0(E). 
The  consumer  adjusts  consumption  at t  =  i, and so for s  E  [i,l]  she 
consumes 
ci-  =e(y)(r  p)(s  aw,t=i 
=  [1 +  0(e)][1  +  Ooz(i) +  0 ,0(V_) +  0(e)] 
=  1 +  00uz(i)  +  0,0(y'_)  +  0(E). 
The covariance  of consumption  and returns for agent i is 
10. For a typical annual calibration  r =  0.01, p 
-  0.05, Ohr  =  (0.78)(0.06),  U2  =  (0.16)2, 
=222  =7T/yoa)2  =  (0.06/3 x 0.16)2,  and a =  0.04. 268 *  GABAIX  & LAIBSON 
cov(Cil,lnR1) =  cov(ci,,ln R)ds 
=  0 ds +  cov  1 +  0oz(i)  +  0<o(V-) 
+  O(e),arz(l)  +r  +  -  -  ds 
= f [02cov(z(i),o-z(1))  +  O(312)]ds 
=  O-2i(1  -  i)  +  O(3/2) 
0o'2i(l  -  i). 
Here and below  -  means  "plus higher-order  terms in  "." 
The  covariance  contains  the  multiplicative  factor i because  the  con- 
sumption  change  reflects only  return information  which  is revealed  be- 
tween  date 0 and date i. The covariance contains the multiplicative  factor 
1 -  i because  the change  in consumption  occurs at time i, and therefore 
affects consumption  for only  the subinterval  [i,1]. 
We  often  analyze  "normalized"  variances  and  covariances.  Specifi- 
cally, we divide the moments  predicted  by the 6D model by the moments 
predicted  by the benchmark  model  with  instantaneous  adjustment  and 
instantaneous  measurement.  Such normalizations  highlight  the "biases" 
introduced  by the 6D economy. 
For the case D =  1, the normalized  covariance  of aggregate  consump- 
tion growth  and equity  returns is 
1  cov(Cl,ln  R1) =  cov(Cil,Rl) 
0o-2  0  or2  D 
n  1 
i(l  -  i) di  =  - 
6 
which  is the (reciprocal of the) 6D factor for D =  1. 
Consider now  the case D-  1. Consumer  i E [0,D) resets her consump- 
tion at t = i. During period 1 (i.e.,  t E [0,1]) only agents with  i E [0,1] will 
reset their consumption.  Consumers  with i E (1,D] will not change  their 
consumption,  so  they  will  have  a  zero  covariance,  cov(C1,Rl)  =  0. 
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cov(C,i,R1) =  i(l  -  i)  if  i E [0,1], 
0O  if  iE  [1,D] . 
For D -  1 the covariance of aggregate consumption is just 1/D times 
what it would  be if we had D =  1: 
1  D  1  di 




The 6D lower covariance  of consumption with returns  translates  into a 
6D higher measured  CRRA 9. Since  0 =  ir/yo2 [equation  (1)], we  get 
C,  7T 
cov  (ln  -,  ln R)  =  6D 
The Euler equation (6) then implies 
=  6Dy, 
as anticipated. 
Several properties of our result should be emphasized. First, holding 
D fixed, the bias in y does not depend on either preferences or technol- 
ogy: r, 7r,-,p, y. This independence  property  will apply to all of the addi- 
tional results that we report in subsequent sections. When D is endoge- 
nously derived, D itself will depend on the preference and technology 
parameters. 
For  simplicity,  the derivation  above assumes that agents with different 
adjustment  indexes i have the same "baseline"  wealth at the start  of each 
period. In the long run this wealth equivalence will not apply exactly. 
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still  hold  approximately.11 Numerical  analysis  with  50-year  adult  lives 
implies  that the actual bias is very close to 6D, the value it would  have if 
all of the wealth  levels  were  identical period by period. 
3.  General  Characterization  of the  Economy 
In  this  section  we  provide  a  general  characterization  of  the  dynamic 
properties  of the economy  described  above.  We analyze  four properties 
of  our  economy:  excess  smoothness  of  consumption  growth,  positive 
autocorrelation  of consumption  growth,  low covariance  of consumption 
growth  and  asset  returns,  and  nonzero  covariance  of  consumption 
growth  and lagged  equity returns. 
Our analysis  focuses  on first-order effects with  respect to the parame- 
ters  r, p, Orr, o2,  or22,  and  a.  Call  E =  max(r,p,  Tr,  cr2,  C202,  ).  We assume 
e to be  small.  Empirically, 8s  0.05 with  a period  length  of a year, and 
E -  0.01 with  a period  length  of a calendar  quarter. All the results  that 
follow  (except one12) are proved  with  O(e312)  residuals.  In fact, at the cost 
of more tedious  calculations,  one can show  that the residuals are actually 
0(82).13 
The following  theorem  is the basis  of this section.  The proof  appears 
in Appendix  A. 
THEOREM  3  The  autocovariance  of consumption  growth at horizon  h -  0 can be 
expressed  as 
cov  (In  ,  In  Ct 
)=  02u2r(D,h)  +  0(83/2),  (9) 
Ch+t-1  Ct-i 
where 
r(D,h)  -  [d(D  +  h)  +  d(D  -  h)  -  d(h)  -  d(-h)l,  (10) 
11. More precisely, it is only important that the average  wealth  of households  that switch  on 
date t not differ significantly  from the average  wealth  of households  that switch  on any 
date s E [t -  D,t  + D]. To guarantee  this cross-date  average  similarity we  could assume 
that each  reset  interval  ends  stochastically.  This randomness  generates  "mixing" be- 
tween  populations  of households  that begin  life with  different reset dates. 
12. Equation (12) is proved  to O(fV),  but with  more tedious  calculations  can be shown  to 
be O(e). 
13. One  follows  exactly  the  lines  of the proofs  presented  here,  but includes  higher-order 
terms.  Calculations  are available from the authors  upon  request. The  6D Bias  and  the  Equity-Premium  Puzzle  * 271 
ED  =  4 
) 
) 
ID + i -  21',  5(11) 
;=0  i  2 x  5! 
and (4) = 4!/i!(4 -  i)! is the binomial  coefficient. 
The expressions  above are valid for noninteger  values  of D and h. The 
functions  d(D) and F(D,h) have the following  properties,  many of which 
will be exploited  in the analysis  that follows14: 
d  C4. 
d(D)=  ID|/2for IDI  2. 
d(O) =7. 
r(D,h)  -  1/D  for large  D. 
F(D,h) '  0. 
F(D,h) >  O  iff D + 2 >  h. 
F(D,h) is nonincreasing  in h. 
F(D,0) is decreasing  in D, but F(D,h) is hump-shaped  for h >  0. 
r(0,h)  =  0 for h  -  2. 
r(0,0)  = 
r(0,1)  = 
Figure 2 plots  d(D) along  with  a second  function  which  we  will  use 
below. 
3.1  r(D,0) 
We begin  by  studying  the  implications  of the  autocovariance  function, 
F(D,h),  for the volatility  of consumption  growth  (i.e.,  by setting  h =  0). 
Like Caballero  (1995), we  also  show  that  delayed  adjustment  induces 
excess  smoothness.  Corollary 4 describes our quantitative  result. 
COROLLARY  4  In thefrictionless economy  (D =  0), var (dC/Ct)/dt =  0o202.  In 
our economy,  with delayed  adjustment  and time aggregation  bias, 
var(ln[C,/Ct  _])  2 
O'202  3 
The volatility of consumption,  '202T(D,O), decreases  as D increases. 
The normalized  variance of consumption,  F(D,0),  is plotted  against D 
in Figure 3. 
14. r is continuous,  so F(O,h)  is intended  as limDr0F(D,h). 272 *  GABAIX & LAIBSON 
FIGURE 2 THE FUNCTIONS d(x) AND  e(x) 
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FIGURE  3 THE  NORMALIZED  VARIANCE  OF CONSUMPTION  GROWTH, 
r(D,O) 
0.7  7 
]r(0,0)=  2/3 
0.6- 
0.5- 
-0.4-  \  d  \ 
L0.3-  \ 
0.2- 
"--~-"'_  r(D,0)  =  1/D for  large D 
0.1  - 
o  l  t  r  ,  I 
0  2  4  6  8  10  12 
D The  6D Bias  and  the  Equity-Premium  Puzzle  ?  273 
For D  =  0,  the  normalized  variance  is  2,  well  below  the  benchmark 
value of 1. The D = 0 case reflects the bias generated by time aggregation 
effects.  As  D rises  above  zero,  delayed  adjustment  effects  also  appear. 
For D  =  0,  1, 2, 4,  20 the  normalized  variance  takes values  0.67,  0.55, 
0.38,  0.22,  and 0.04. For large D, the bias is approximately  1/D. 
Intuitively,  as D increases,  none  of the short-run volatility of the econ- 
omy is reflected  in consumption  growth,  since only a proportion  1/D  of 
the agents  adjust consumption  in any single  period.  Moreover,  the size 
of the adjustments  only  grows  as  /-D. So the total magnitude  of adjust- 
ment  is falling as 1/-D,  and the variance falls as 1/D. 
3.2 F(D,h)  WITH  h > 0 
We now  consider the properties of the (normalized)  autocovariance  func- 
tion  r(D,h)  for h  =  1,  2,  4,  8.  Figure  4 plots  these  respective  curves, 
ordered  from  h  =  1 on  top  to  h  =  8 at the  bottom.  Note  that  in  the 
benchmark  case-instantaneous  adjustment  and  no  time-aggregation 
bias-the  autocovariance  of  consumption  growth  is  zero.  With  only 
time-aggregation  effects,  the  one-period  autocovariance  is  r(0,1)  =  6, 
and all h-period autocovariances  with h >  1 are zero. 
FIGURE  4 NORMALIZED  AUTOCOVARIANCE  F(D,h)  WITH  h = 1, 2, 4, 8 
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3.3 REVISITING  THE  EQUITY-PREMIUM  PUZZLE 
We can also state a formal and more general analogue  of Theorem 2. 
PROPOSITION  5  Suppose that consumers  reset their consumption  every ha  peri- 
ods. Then the covariance  between  consumption  growth and stock-market  returns 
at horizon h will be 
cov  (In  t+h],  In R[t,t+h]  +  (/2), 
C[t-h,t]  b(D) 
where D =  ha/h and 
b(D)  6D  for  D1l, 
6  2  for  O  D  1. 
3(1 -  D) +  D 
The associated  correlation  is 
corr  (In  [tt+h,  In R[tt+h  b(D)(D,)  +  O  ).  (12) 
C  [t-h ,t] 
+ 
) 
In the benchmark  model  with  continuous  sampling  and adjustment, 
the covariance  is just 
cov(d In Ct,d In R) 
=  0a-2 
dt 
Moreover,  in that model  the covariance  at horizon  h is just 
cov  (In  ,lnR[tt+h  )  = 0o2h.  v 
[t-h,t] 
So the effect introduced  by the 6D model  is captured by the factor 1/b(D) 
which  appears in Proposition  5. 
We compare  this  benchmark  with  the  effects  generated  by  our  dis- 
crete-observation,  delayed-adjustment  model.  As the horizon  h tends  to 
+oo, the normalized  covariance between  consumption  growth  and asset 
returns tends  to 
Of2h  1  1  1 
lim  -  - 
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which  is true for any fixed value  of ha. This effect is due  exclusively  to 
time  aggregation.  Delayed  adjustment  ceases  to matter  as the  horizon 
length  goes  to infinity. 
Proposition  5 covers  the  special  case  discussed  in Section  2: horizon 
h =  1, and reset period  ha -  D >  1. For this case,  the normalized  covari- 
ance is approximately  equal to 
0o2  1  1 
b(D)  00-2  6D 
Figure  5 plots  the  multiplicative  covariance  bias  factor l/b(ha/h) as  a 
function  of h, for ha =  1. In the benchmark  case  (i.e.,  continuous  sam- 
pling  and  instantaneous  adjustment)  there  is no bias; the bias factor is 
unity. In the  case with  only  time-aggregation  effects  (i.e.,  discrete  sam- 
pling  and ha = 0) the bias factor is l/b(O/h) =  -. 
Hence,  low  levels  of comovement  show  up most  sharply  when  hori- 
zons  are low. For D  -  1 (i.e.,  ha/h >  1), the covariance between  consump- 
tion growth  and stock returns is 6D times lower  than one would  expect 
in the model  with  continuous  adjustment  and continuous  sampling. 
FIGURE  5 MULTIPLICATIVE  COVARIANCE  BIAS  FACTOR  1/b(l/h) 
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We  now  characterize  the  covariance  between  current  consumption 
growth  and lagged  equity  returns. 
THEOREM  6  Suppose that consumers reset their consumption every ha =  Dh 
periods.  Then the covariance between ln(C[t,t+l/C[t_  ,t])  and lagged equity returns 
In R[t+Sl,t+s2]  (s1 <  s2  ?  1) will be 
[t-l,t] 
with 
V(D,sl,s2)  =  e(sl) -  e(s2) -  e(sl + D) + e(s2  + D)  (14)  V(D,s,s2)  =  ,  (14)  D 
where 
3x2 -  IX13 
for  Ixl  1, 
e(x) =  (  (15) 
3x  -  1 
for  Ix|  1.  6 
The following  corollary will be used  in the empirical section. 
COROLLARY  7  The covariance between In (C[s+h-l,s+h}/C[s-  ,sl) and lagged equity 
returns In R  [s+l] will be 
( 
, 
C  -[s+h  -l,+h] 
, 
R  ) 
C [s-l,s] 
2 e(1  +  D)  -  e(1)  -  e(1  -  h +  D)  +  e(  -  h)  2)  (16) 
D 
In particular,  when h -  D  +  2, cov (ln [C[s+h-l,s+hI/C[s-i,s]],  In R[,s+l]) =  or2; 
one sees full adjustment  at horizons (weakly)  greater than D + 2. 
In  practice,  Theorem  6  is  most  naturally  applied  when  the  lagged 
equity returns correspond  to specific lagged  time periods: s2 = sl + 1, s  = 
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FIGURE  6 NORMALIZED  COVARIANCE  OF CONSUMPTION 
GROWTH  AND LAGGED  ASSET  RETURNS,  V(D,s,s + 1), FOR 
D =  0.25,1,  2, 4 
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Note  that  V(D,sl,s2)  >  0 iff s2 >  -D  -  1.  Hence,  the  covariance  in 
Theorem 6 is positive  only  at lags 0 through  D +  1. 
Figure 6 plots  the normalized  covariances  of consumption  growth  and 
lagged  asset  returns  for  different  values  of  D.  Specifically,  we  plot 
V(D,s,s  +  1) against s for D = 0.25,  1, 2, 4, from right to left. 
Consider  a  regression  of  consumption  growth  on  some  arbitrary 
(large) number of lagged  returns, 
In  Ct+  s ln R,l+ 
Ct  s=s 
One  should  find 
3s  =  OV(D,s,s +  1). 
Note  that the sum of the normalized  lagged  covariances  is one: 
1  0  ,  +1 
OC2  cov(lnC[t't,  In R[t+s,t+s+l]) 
0  s=--o  [t-l,t] 
o 
-  V(D,s,s  +  1)=  1. 
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This implies  that the sum of the coefficients  will equal the portfolio share 
of the stock market,15 
0 
s=  0.  (17) 
s=-D-1 
3.4 EXTENSION  TO MULTIPLE  ASSETS  AND 
HETEROGENEITY  IN D 
We now  extend  the framework  to the empirically  relevant case of multi- 
ple  assets  with  stochastic  returns.  We also  introduce  heterogeneity  in 
D's.  Such heterogeneity  may arise because  different  D's apply to differ- 
ent asset classes  and because  D may vary across consumers. 
Say  that  there  are  different  types  of  consumers  I  =  1, . . . ,n  and 
different  types  of asset  accounts  m =  1, . . .,n,,.  Consumers  of  type  I 
exist in proportion  p;(ElPI  =  1) and look at account  m every  Dm,  periods. 
The consumer  has wealth  w,m  invested  in account  m, and has an associ- 
ated  marginal  propensity  to  consume  (MPC),  a,,m.  In most  models  the 
MPC's  will  be  the  same  for  all assets,  but  for the  sake  of  behavioral 
realism and generality  we  consider  possibly  different MPC's. 
For instance,  income  shocks  could  have  a low  D  =  1,  stock-market 
shocks  a higher  D  =  4,  and  shocks  to housing  wealth  a D  =  40.16 Ac- 
count  m has  standard  deviation  m-,,  and  shocks  dzmt. Denote  by  pm, = 
cov(dznt,dzmt)/dt  the correlation matrix of the shocks,  and by  rm,  = pmn,  m(r 
their covariance  matrix. 
Total  wealth  in  the  economy  is  YZ,mPpwlm,  and  total  consumption 
EI,m  plclmWlm.  A useful  and natural quantity is 
pllmwlm  (18) 
=r',m,,pjrajCm,Wrm, 
A  shock  dzmt  in  wealth  account  m will  get  translated  at mean  interval 
1EtpjDjm  into  a consumption  shock  dC/C  =  ElOlmdZnt. 
We can calculate the second  moments  of our economy. 
15. This is true in a world with only equities and riskless bonds. In general, it's more 
appropriate  to use a model with several assets, including  human capital,  as in the next 
section. 
16. This example implies different short-run marginal propensities to consume out of 
wealth windfalls in different asset classes. Thaler (1992) describes one behavioral 
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THEOREM  8  In the economy  described  above, we have 
cov  (n  cL  n  R  n Rtt+1  )  =  OmomnV(Dm,l,s2) +  0(e12)  (19) 
\  ^~t-l  /  l~,m 
and 
cov  (In  n  C  -t+h _ l  )  =  im'lmOIm'(Tmm'F(Dm,mD1im',h)  +  0(/2)  (20) 
Ct+h-l  t-1(20) 
with 
F(D,D',h)  =  [d(D  +  h)  +  d(D'  -  h)  -  d(D'  -  D  -  h)  -  d(h)],  (21) 
DD' 
V defined  in (14), and d defined  in (11). 
The  function  F(D,t),  defined  earlier  in  (10),  relates  to  r(D,D',t)  by 
r(D,D,t)  =  F(D,t).  Recall that  V(D,O,1) =  1/b(D). So a conclusion  from 
(19) is that,  when  there are several  types  of people  and assets,  the bias 
that the econometrician  would  find is the harmonic mean of the individ- 
ual biases  b(Dim),  the weights  being  given  by the shares of variance. 
As an application,  consider  the case with  identical  agents  (n-  =  1; 1 is 
suppressed  for this example)  and different assets with the same MPC, am 
=  a. Recall that V(D,O,1) =  1/b(D). So the bias  Ay/y  will be 
V  /022  (21 
.Y  ( 
mm 
E  m2b,(m)  -  (22) 
,.)/  V  ^  ,  O2 
2 
Hence,  with  several  assets,  the aggregate  bias is the weighted  mean  of 
the biases,  the mean  being  the harmonic  mean,  and the weight  of asset 
m being  the share of the total variance  that comes  from this asset.  This 
allows  us,  in Appendix  B, to discuss  a modification  of the  model  with 
differential attention  to big shocks  (jumps). 
These  relationships  are derived  exactly  along  the  lines  of the  single- 
asset,  single-type  economy  of the previous  sections.  Equation (19) is the 
covariance between  returns, In R[t+s  lt+s] =  'nz  t+slt+s2]  + 0(e),  and the repre- 
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Ct-,  m  - 
in  = 
S  I  -  1  a(i)ztl  +i-ODt-l+ildi  +0(3/2),  (23) 
where  a(i)  =  (1  -  il)+. Equation  (23) can also  be  used  to calculate  the 
autocovariance  (20) of consumption,  if one defines 
F(D,D',h)  =  a(i)a)cov(zt-  +  i - D,  t-  +il Z[t  - 1  +j+h - D',t  1  +j  +h)  .  (24)  a(i)a(j)cov(z[t--+i-D't-l+i]'[t-l+j+h-D',t-l+j+h])  (24) 
Ji,e[-U1,1  V D' 
The closed-form  expression  (21) of F is derived  in Appendix  A. 
3.5 SKETCH  OF THE  PROOF 
Proofs of the propositions  appear in Appendix  A.  In this subsection  we 
provide  intuition for those  arguments.  We start with the following  repre- 
sentation  formula for consumption  growth. 
PROPOSITION  9  We have 
1  1 
ln C1=  Oo  a(i)z[t+~-Dt+  di +  0(e).  (25) 
Ct  1  D 
Note that the order of magnitude  of Ooa-  1  a(i)z[t+i D,t+idi/D is the order of 
magnitude  of or,  i.e.  O(V/~). 
Assets  returns can be represented  as In R[t+sl t+s2]  = 
OZ[t+sl,t+s2  +  O(e).  So 
we  get 
cov  (ln  C-,lnR+S,s+2  ) 
=  6Of2 j  a (i) cov(z_  +iDt-i]Z  +  )di +  ?0(32)  (26) 
J-o0  Fai0 A  -12  -  -  irdi 
=  0'2  f  a(i)  A ([t  -  1 +  i -  D,t  -  1 +  il  n  [s  +  sl,s  +  s2) 
-1D 
+o(3/2).  (27) 
Here A(I)  is the length  (the Lebesgue  measure)  of the interval I. Likewise 
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Ch+t-l  C1t 
1  a(i)acov(z  di d  + 
- 
2?2f~  f  Xa(i)a()COV(Z[h+t-l+i-D,h+t-l+i]Z[  Dt-l+j])d  d  +  0(  /2) 
=  02c2  jf1  a(i)a(j)A([h + t -  1 + i -  D,h  + t -  1 + i] 
di dj 
n[t  -  1 +  -  D,t  -1  +  ]) 
D 
+  0(/2). 
D D 
The bulk  of  the  proof  is  devoted  to  the  explicit  calculation  of this  last 
equation  and equation  (27). 
4.  Endogenizing  D 
Until now,  we have  assumed  that D is fixed exogenously.  In this section 
we  discuss  how  D is chosen,  and provide  a framework for calibrating D. 
Because of delayed  adjustment,  the actual consumption  path will devi- 
ate  from  the  first-best  instantaneously  adjusted  consumption  path.  In 
steady  state, the welfare loss associated  with this deviation  is equivalent, 
using  a money  metric, to a proportional  wealth  loss  of17 
y  l AC \2 
Ac=  2 E (-  )  + higher-order  terms.  (28) 
Here  AC is  the  difference  between  actual  consumption  and  first-best 
instantaneously  adjusted  consumption.  If the asset is observed  every  D 
periods,  we have 
Ac = 4 yO22D  + 0(e2)  (29) 
Equations  (28) and  (29) are derived  in Appendix  A.  We assume18 that 
each  consumption  adjustment  costs  a proportion  q of the  wealth  w. A 
17. This is a second-order  approximation.  See Cochrane  (1989)  for a similar  derivation. 
18. This would come from a utility function 
~ 
/  \-y  01-0  c 
~ 
Y 
U=  E  1 -  q  e- Pi  e-"S  ds 
_  \  i  Jo  1 -  y 
if the  adjustments  to  consumption  are made  at dates  (,i)i0o  A  session  of  consumption 
planning at time t lowers utility by a consumption  equivalent  of qe-Pt. 282 *  GABAIX  & LAIBSON 
sensible  calibration  of  q would  be  qw =  (1%)(annual  consumption)  = 
(0.01)(0.04)w  =  (4 x  10-4)w. 
The NPV of costs as a fraction of current wealth is qEn,>e-'"D, implying  a 
total cognitive  cost of 
q  A- =  1e-pD 
The optimal  D minimizes  both consumption  variability costs  and cogni- 
tive costs,  i.e.,  D* =  arg min Ac +  Aq: 
1  q 
D  =  arg  min4 -  y2r2D  +1  D  4  1e-  pD 
so 
1  e-PD  qp 
4 
y  2  q 
(1  -  e-PD)2  (eD/2-ePD/2)2 
qP 
2  PD  4 sinh 
and we  find for the optimal  D 
D  =-  arcsinh  I  q 
p  2020  .  2 
2  q  (30) 
when  pD <<  1. 
We make the following  calibration choices:  q = 4 x  10-4, Cr2  =  (0.16)2, 
y =  3, p =  0.01,  r =  0.06,  and  0 =  rr/(ycr2)  =  0.78. Substituting  into our 
equation  for D, we  find 
D -  2 years. 
This calibration implies  that D-values  of at least 1 year (or 4 quarters) are 
quite easy to defend.  Moreover,  our formula for D* is highly  sensitive  to 
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fraction of her wealth  in equities-because  most of her wealth  is in other 
forms  like human  capital or home  equity-then  the  value  of D will be 
quite  large.  If 0  =  0.05 because  of liquidity  constraints,  then  D* -  30 
years. 
Note  that  formula  (30) would  work  for  other  types  of  shocks  than 
stock-market shocks.  With several accounts indexed  by m, people  would 
pay attention  to account m at intervals  of length 
Dm=  -  arcsinh  /  qmP  (31) 
p  ,2  0.2  m 
with qmwm  representing  the cost of evaluating  asset m, and Om  generalized 
as in equation  (18). Equation (31) implies  sensible  comparative  statics on 
the frequency  of reappraisal. Thus we  get a mini-theory  of the allocation 
of attention  across accounts.19 
5.  Consequencesfor  Macroeconomics  and Finance 
5.1 SIMPLE  CALIBRATED  MACRO  MODEL 
To draw  together  the  most  important  implications  of  this  paper,  we 
describe  a  simple  model  of  the  U.S.  economy.  We  use  our  model  to 
predict  the  variability  of  consumption  growth,  the  autocorrelation  of 
consumption  growth,  and  the  covariance  of consumption  growth  with 
equity returns. 
Assume  the economy  is composed  of two classes  of consumers:  stock- 
holders  and nonstockholders.20 The consumers  that we model  in Section 
2 are stockholders.  Nonstockholders  do not  have  any  equity  holdings, 
and  instead  consume  earnings  from human  capital.  Stockholders  have 
aggregate  wealth  St, and  nonstockholders  have  aggregate  wealth  Nt. 
Total consumption  is given  by the weighted  sum 
Ct =  a(S,  +  N). 
Recall that  a  is  the  marginal  propensity  to  consume.  So  consumption 
growth  can be decomposed  into 
19. See  Gabaix and  Laibson  (2000a,b) for a broader  theoretical  and  empirical  analysis  of 
attention  allocation. 
20. This is at a given  point  in time.  A major reason  for nonparticipation  is that relatively 
young  agents  have  most  of their wealth  in human  capital,  against  which  they  cannot 
borrow to invest  in equities  (see Constantinides,  Donaldson,  and Mehra, 2000). 284 *  GABAIX  & LAIBSON 
dC  sdS  ndN 
=  + 
C  S  N 
Here s represents  the wealth  of stockholders  divided  by the total wealth 
of the economy,  and n =  1 -  s represents  the wealth  of nonstockholders 
divided  by the total wealth  of the economy.  So s and n are wealth  shares 
for stockholders  and nonstockholders  respectively.  We make the simpli- 
fying approximation  that s and n are constant  in the empirically relevant 
medium  run. 
Using  a first-order approximation, 
ln(Ct/Ct_l)  = s In(S/St_  ) +  n ln(N,/Nt_l). 
If stockholders  have loading  in stocks  0, the ratio of stock wealth  to total 
wealth  in the economy  is 
0  =  sO.  (32) 
To calibrate the  economy  we  begin  with  the  observation  that human 
capital  claims  about 
2  of  GDP  Y. In this  model,  human  capital  is  the 
discounted  net  present  value  of  labor income  accruing  to  the  current 
cohort of nonstockholders.  We assume  that the expected  duration of the 
remaining  working  life of a typical worker is 30 years,  implying  that the 
human  capital of the current workforce  is equal to 
r30  2  2(1 -  e-30r) 
H=  e-rt-Ydt=  Y =17Y, 
Jo  3  3r 
where  Y is aggregate  income.  Capital income claims  3 of GDP. Assuming 
that it has the riskiness  (and the returns) of the stock market, the amount 
of capital is 
1 
K =  Y  5Y, 
3(r +  Ir) 
so that the equity  share of total wealth  is 
K 
0  =  -  0.22. 
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By assuming  that all capital is identical to stock-market capital, we impli- 
citly increase  the  predicted  covariance  between  stock  returns  and  con- 
sumption  growth.  A more realistic model would  assume a more heteroge- 
neous  capital stock, and hence  a lower covariance between  stock returns 
and consumption  growth. 
In this model  economy,  we work with  data at the quarterly frequency. 
We assume  ac =  0.16/V4,  i  =  0.06/4,  r =  0.01/4,  and  y =  3,  so  the  equity 
share  [equation  (1)  above]  is  0  =  7r/(ycr2) =  0.78.  Then  equation  (32) 
implies  s =  0.28.  In other words,  28% of the wealth  in this economy  is 
owned  by shareholders.  All of stockholders'  claims are in either stock or 
risk-free bonds.  To keep things  simple,  we  counterfactually  assume  that 
N and S are uncorrelated. 
We have to take a stand on the distribution  of D's in the economy.  We 
assume  that D-values  are uniformly  distributed  from 0 to D =  120 quar- 
ters (i.e.,  30 years). We adopt this distribution  to capture a wide  range of 
investment  styles.  Extremely active investors  will have a D-value close to 
0,  while  passive  savers  may  put  their  retirement  wealth  in  a  special 
mental  account,  effectively  ignoring  the accumulating  wealth  until after 
age  65 (Thaler, 1992). We are agnostic  about  the true distribution  of D- 
types,  and we  present  this example  for illustrative  purposes.  Any  wide 
range of D-values  would  serve to make our key points. 
To keep  the  focus  on  stockholders,  we  assume  that nonstockholders 
adjust their consumption  instantaneously  in response  to innovations  in 
labor income-i.e.,  at intervals  of length  0. 
Theorem 3 implies  that the quarterly volatility  of aggregate consump- 
tion growth  is 
C =  nF2(0,0)(N  +  O  2 f  f  F(D,D',0)  2dd 
,D'E[O,D]  D 
We assume  that the  quarterly standard  deviation  of growth  in human 
capital is  oN  =  0.01.21 Our assumptions  jointly  imply  that orc  =  0.0063.22 
Most  of  this  volatility  comes  from  variation  in  the  consumption  of 
nonstockholders.  Stockholders  generate  relatively little consumption  vola- 
21. We calibrate 0-N  from postwar  U.S.  data on wage  growth.  From 1959 to 2000 the stan- 
dard  deviation  of  per  capita  real wage  growth  at the  quarterly  frequency  has  been 
0.0097  (National  Income  and  Product  Accounts,  Commerce  Department,  Bureau  of 
Economic  Analysis).  If wages  follow  a random  walk,  then  the  standard  deviation  of 
growth  in human  capital,  oN, will equal the standard deviation  in wage  growth. 
22. Figure 3 plots  the function  r(D,0).  Note  that F(0,0) =  2 and that F(D,0)  -  1/D  for large 
D. In the decomposition  of  2c  above,  n2F(0,0)0a2  = 0.34 X 10-4 and 
0202  f JD,D'E[O,D]  F(D,D',O)dD  dD'/D2  =  0.049  X  10-4. 286 *  GABAIX  & LAIBSON 
tility, because  they  represent  a relatively  small share  of total consump- 
tion  and because  they  only  adjust  consumption  every  D periods.  This 
adjustment  rule smooths  out the response  to wealth  innovations,  since 
only a fraction 1/D of stockholders  adjust their consumption  during any 
single  period  and the average adjustment  is of magnitude  /D. 
Our model's  implied  quarterly consumption  volatility-arc  = 0.0063- 
lies below  its empirical counterpart.  We calculate the empirical  -c using 
the  cross-country  panel  dataset  created  by  Campbell  (1999).23  We esti- 
mate  o-c =  0.0106 by averaging  across all of the countries  in Campbell's 
dataset:  Australia,  Canada,  France, Germany,  Italy, Japan, the  Nether- 
lands,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the 
United  States.24 Part of the gap between  our theoretical  standard  devia- 
tion and the empirical  standard  deviation  may  reflect measurement  er- 
ror,  which  should  systematically  raise  the  standard  deviation  of  the 
empirical  data.  In addition,  most  of  the  empirical  consumption  series 
include  durables, which  should  raise  the  variability  of  consumption 
growth  (Mankiw,  1982).  By contrast,  the  U.S.  consumption  data  omit 
durables,  and  for the  United  States  we  calculate  occ =  0.0054,  closely 
matching  our theoretical value. 
Next,  we  turn  to  the  first-order  autocorrelation  of  consumption 
growth,  applying  again Theorem 3: 
Pc  corr  ln Ct-  In Ct-2 




dDd~Vrl  (D,  D',) 
D dD 
=  (o2)-1  (n2  (0,1)  +  022  (DD',)  dDdD' ) 
,D'E[0,D]  D 
Using  our calibration choices,  our model  implies  Pc =  0.34.25 This theo- 
retical prediction  lies well  above  the empirical estimate  of  -0.11,  found 
by  averaging  across  the  country-by-country  autocorrelations  in  the 
Campbell  dataset.  Here too,  both  measurement  error and the inclusion 
of durables are likely to bias the empirical correlations down.  Again,  the 
U.S.  data,  which  omits  durables,  come  much  closer  to  matching  our 
theoretical  prediction.  In the U.S.  data, Pc =  0.22. 
23. We thank John Campbell  for sharing this dataset with  us. 
24. We use quarterly data from the Campbell dataset.  The quarterly data begins  in 1947 for 
the United  States,  and begins  close to 1970 for most of the other countries.  The dataset 
ends  in 1996. 
25. The  respective  effects  are  n22rF(0,1)  =  0.077  x  10-4 and  2o2 J fDD'Eio,DI  F(D,D',1) 
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We  turn  now  to  the  covariation  between  aggregate  consumption 
growth  and equity  returns,  cov(ln[Ct/Ct_l,ln  Rt). We find 
cov  (In  I-  ,ln  Rt )  =  @2  V(D,0,1)  =  0.13  X 10-4, 
V  c_ti  DE-J[O,D]  D 
assuming  that  in  the  short  run  the  consumption  growth  of nonstock- 
holders  is  uncorrelated  with  that  of  stockholders.  The  covariance 
estimate  of  0.13  x  10-4  almost  matches  the  average  covariance  in  the 
Campbell dataset,  0.14 x  10-4.  This time,  however,  the U.S.  data do not 
"outperform" the rest of the countries  in the Campbell  dataset.  For the 
United  States,  the  covariance  is  0.60  x  10-4.  However,  all  of  these 
covariances  come  much closer to matching  our model  than to matching 
the  benchmark  model  with  instantaneous  adjustment  and  measure- 
ment.  The benchmark  model  with  no  delayed  adjustment  predicts  that 
the  quarterly  covariance  will  be  00o2  -  50  x  10-4. 
What would  an econometrician  familiar with the consumption-CAPM 
literature conclude  if he  observed  quarterly data from our 6D economy, 
but  thought  he  were  observing  data  from  the  benchmark  economy? 
First, he might  calculate 
7IT 
y  ~~=  =7r2  1000, 
cov(ln[C  /Ct _],lnRt) 
and conclude  that the coefficient  of relative risk aversion  is over 1000. If 
he were  familiar with  the work of Mankiw  and Zeldes  (1991), he might 
restrict his analysis  to stockholders  and calculate 
I7 
y  =  -  300  . 
cov(ln[St/St  L],lnRt) 
Finally, if he read Mankiw and Zeldes carefully, he would  realize that he 
should  also do a continuous-time  adjustment  (of the type  suggested  by 
Grossman,  Melino,  and Shiller,  1987), leading  to another halving  of his 
estimate.  But, after all of this hard work,  he would  still end  up with  a 
biased coefficient of relative risk aversion: 300/2 = 150. For this economy, 
the true coefficient  of relative risk aversion  is 3! 
These  observations  suggest  that the literature on the equity-premium 
puzzle  should  be reappraised.  Once one takes account of delayed  adjust- 288 *  GABAIX  & LAIBSON 
ment,  high  estimates  of  y  no  longer  seem  anomalous.  If workers  in 
midlife  take decades  to  respond  to innovations  in  their  retirement  ac- 
counts,  we  should  expect naive  estimates  of y that are far too high. 
Defenders  of the Euler-equation approach might argue that economists 
can go ahead estimating  the value of y and simply correct those estimates 
for the biases  introduced  by  delayed  adjustment.  However,  we  do not 
view this as a fruitful approach, since the adjustment  delays are difficult to 
observe  or calibrate. 
For an active stock trader, knowledge  of personal financial wealth  may 
be updated  daily, and consumption  may adjust equally  quickly  By con- 
trast, for the typical employee  who  invests  in a 401(k) plan,  retirement 
wealth  may be in its own  mental  account,26 and hence  may not be inte- 
grated  into  current  consumption  decisions.  This  generates  lags  of  de- 
cades or more between  stock price changes  and consumption  responses. 
Without  precise  knowledge  of  the  distribution  of  D-values,  econo- 
metricians will be hard pressed  to measure  y accurately using  the Euler- 
equation  approach. 
In summary,  our  model  tells  us  that high  imputed  y-values  are not 
anomalous  and that high-frequency  properties  of the aggregate  data can 
be  explained  by  a model  with  delayed  adjustment.  Hence,  the  equity 
premium  may not be a puzzle. 
Finally, we wish  to note that our delayed-adjustment  model is comple- 
mentary to the theoretical work of other authors who  have  analyzed  the 
equity-premium  puzzle.27 Our qualitative  approach has  some  similarity 
with  the  habit-formation  approach  (e.g.,  Constantinides,  1990; Abel, 
1990; Campbell and Cochrane,  1999). Habit-formation  models  imply that 
slow  adjustment  is  optimal  because  households  prefer  to  smooth  the 
growth rate (not the level) of consumption.  In our 6D model,  slow adjust- 
ment is optimal only because  decision  costs make high-frequency  adjust- 
ment  too expensive. 
6. Review  of Related  Empirical  Evidence 
In this section,  we review  two types  of evidence  that lend support  to our 
model.  In the first subsection  we review  survey evidence  which  suggests 
that  investors  know  relatively  little  about  high-frequency  variation  in 
their equity wealth.  In the second  subsection  we  show  that equity  inno- 
vations  predict future consumption  growth. 
26. See Thaler (1992). 
27. For other  proposed  solutions  to the  equity-premium  puzzle  see  Kocherlakota  (1996), 
Bernartzi and Thaler (1995), and Barberis, Huang  and Santos  (2000). The  6D Bias  and  the  Equity-Premium  Puzzle  *  289 
6.1 KNOWLEDGE  OF EQUITY  PRICES 
Consumers  can't respond  to high-frequency  innovations  in equity  val- 
ues  if they don't keep close  tabs on the values  of their equity portfolios. 
In this  subsection,  we  discuss  survey  evidence  that suggests  that con- 
sumers  may  know  little  about high-frequency  variation  in the value  of 
their equity wealth.28 We also discuss  related evidence  that suggests  that 
consumers  may not  adjust consumption  in response  to business-cycle- 
frequency  variation  in  their  equity  holdings.  All  of  this  evidence  is 
merely  suggestive,  since survey  responses  may be unreliable. 
The 1998 Survey  of Consumer  Finances  (SCF) was  conducted  during 
the  last  six months  of  1998, a period  of substantial  variation  in equity 
prices.  In July the  average  value  of the  Wilshire 5000 equity  index  was 
10,770.  The index  dropped  to an average  value  of 9,270 in September, 
before rising back to an average value of 10,840 in December.  Kennickell, 
Starr-McCluer,  and  Surette  (2000)  analyze  the  1998  SCF  data  to  see 
whether  self-reported  equity  wealth  covaries  with  movements  in stock- 
market  indexes.  They  find  that  the  SCF equity  measures  are  uncor- 
related with  the value  of the Wilshire index  on the respondents'  respec- 
tive  interview  dates.  Only  respondents  who  were  active  stock  traders 
(?12  trades/year)  showed  a significant  correlation between  equity hold- 
ings and the value  of the Wilshire index. 
Dynan  and  Maki (2000) report  related  results.  They  analyze  the  re- 
sponses  to the Consumer  Expenditure  Survey (CEX) from the first quar- 
ter of 1996 to the first quarter of 1999. During this period,  the U.S. equity 
markets rose over 15% during almost every  12-month period.  Neverthe- 
less,  when  respondents  were  surveyed  for the CEX, one-third  of stock- 
holders  reported  no change  in the value  of their securities  during the 12- 
month  period before their respective  interviews.29 
Starr-McCluer  (2000)  analyzes  data  from  the  Michigan  Survey  Re- 
search Center (SRC) collected  in the summer  of 1997. One of the survey 
questions  asked,  "Have you  [Has your family] changed  the amount  you 
spend  or save as a result of the trend in stock prices during the past few 
years?"  Among  all  stockholder  respondents,  85.0% said  "no  effect." 
Among  stockholder  respondents  with  most  of their stock outside  retire- 
ment  accounts,  83.3% said  "no effect."  Even  among  stockholders  with 
large portfolios  (-  $250,000),  78.4% said "no effect." 
28. We are grateful to Karen Dynan  for pointing  out much of this evidence  to us. 
29. For the  purposes  of  this  survey  a change  in  the  value  of  equity  securities  includes 
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6.2 THE  EFFECT  OF LAGGED  EQUITY  RETURNS  ON 
CONSUMPTION  GROWTH 
Dynan  and  Maki (2000) analyze  household-level  data on  consumption 
growth from the CEX, and ask whether  lagged  stock returns affect future 
consumption  growth.  They break their results down  for nonstockholders 
and stockholders.  For stockholders  with at least $10,000 in securities  a 1% 
innovation  in the value  of equity holdings  generates  a 1.03% increase  in 
consumption  of nondurables  and services.  However,  this increase in con- 
sumption  occurs with  a lag. One  third of the increase occurs during  the 
first 9 months  after the equity price innovation.  Another third occurs 10 to 
18 months  after the innovation.  Another  quarter of the increase occurs 19 
to 27 months  after the innovation,  and the rest of the increase occurs 28 to 
36 months  after the innovation. 
We now  turn to evidence  from aggregate  data. We look for a relation- 
ship  between  equity  returns  and  future  consumption  growth.  Specifi- 
cally,  we  evaluate  Cov  (ln[Ct+h/Ct], In Rt+,) for h =  1,  2,  .  .  . , 25. 
Under the null hypothesis  of D = 0, the quarterly covariance between 
equity  returns and consumption  growth  is predicted  to be 
(  Ct+l 
0.2 
Cov  (n  C,ln  =  O2  2 
(0.22)(0.16//-4)2 
2 
=  0.0007. 
The effects of time-aggregation  bias are incorporated  into this prediction. 
An equity  innovation  during period  t + 1 only affects consumption  after 
the  occurrence  of  the  equity  innovation.  So  the  predicted  covariance, 
Cov(ln[Ct,+/Ct],ln  Rt+l), is half  as  great  as it would  be  if consumption 
growth  were  measured  instantaneously. 
This time-aggregation  bias vanishes  once we  extend  the consumption 
growth  horizon  to two  or more periods.  So, if D = 0 and h-  2, 
Cov(ln[Ct+h/Ct],lnRt+l)  =  =o2 
=  (0.22)(0.16/V4)2 
=  0.0014. 
Hence  the assumption  D =  0 implies  that the profile of 
Cov(ln[Ct+h/Ct],ln  Rt+l)  for h >  2 should  be flat. The 6D Bias and the Equity-Premium  Puzzle *  291 









1. Dataset is from Campbell  (1999).  Full dataset includes Australia,  Canada, France,  Germany,  Italy, 
Japan,  the Netherlands,  Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,  the United Kingdom,  and the United States. 
2. To  identify countries  with large  stock  markets,  we ordered  the countries  by the ratio  of stock-market 
capitalization  to GDP (1993).  The top half of the countries  were included in our large-stock-market 
subsample:  Switzerland  (0.87), the United Kingdom  (0.80), the United States (0.72), the Netherlands 
(0.46),  Australia  (0.42),  and Japan  (0.40). 
3. We assume that households have D-values  that are  uniformly  distributed  from  0 to 30 years. 
Figure 7 plots  the  empirical  values  of Cov(ln[Ct+h/Ct],ln  Rt,+) for h E 
{1,2,  . . . ,25}.30  We use the cross-country  panel dataset created by Camp- 
bell (1999).31  Figure 7 plots the value of Cov(ln[Ct+h/C],ln  Rt+l), averaging 
across  all  of  the  countries  in  Campbell's  dataset:  Australia,  Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,  Spain, Sweden,  Switzer- 
land, the United Kingdom,  and the United States.32  Figure 7 also plots the 
30. See Hall (1978) for early evidence  that lagged  stock returns predict future consumption 
growth.  See Lettau and Ludvigson  (2001) for a VAR approach that implies  that lagged 
stock returns do not predict  future consumption  growth.  Future work  should  attempt 
to reconcile  our results with  those  of Lettau and Ludvigson. 
31. We thank John Campbell  for giving  this dataset to us. 
32. Specifically,  we  calculate  Cov(ln  Rt+,ln[Ct+h/Ct]) for each  country  and  each h-quarter 
horizon,  h  {1,2,  .  . .  ,25}. We then  average  across all of the countries  in the sample. 
We use  quarterly data from the Campbell  dataset.  The quarterly data begin  in 1947 for 
the United  States,  and begin  close to 1970 for most  of the other countries.  The dataset 
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average value of Cov(ln[Cth1/Ct],  ln Rt+l), averaging across all of the coun- 
tries with large stock markets. Specifically, we ordered the countries in the 
Campbell  dataset by  the  ratio of stock-market  capitalization  to GDP in 
1993. The top half of the countries were included  in our large-stock-market 
subsample:  Switzerland  (0.87),  United  Kingdom  (0.80)  United  States 
(0.72), Netherlands  (0.46), Australia (0.42), and Japan (0.40). 
Two  properties  of  the  empirical  covariances  stand  out.  First,  they 
slowly  rise as the consumption  growth horizon  h increases.  Contrast this 
increase  with  the  counterfactual  prediction  for the  D  =  0 case  that the 
covariance  should  plateau  at h =  2.  Second,  the  empirical  covariances 
are much  lower  than  the  covariance  predicted  by  the  D  =  0 case.  For 
example,  at a horizon  of 4 quarters, the average  empirical covariance  is 
roughly  0.0002,  far smaller than the theoretical prediction  of 0.0014. 
Figure 7 also plots the predicted33 covariance profile implied by the 6D 
model.34 To generate  this  prediction  we  assume  that D-values  are uni- 
formly distributed  from 0 years to 30 years,  as discussed  in the previous 
section. 
The  6D  model  predicts  that  the  covariance  Cov(ln[Ct+h/Ct], In Rt+l) 
slowly  rises with  the horizon  h. To understand  this effect, recall that the 
6D economy  slowly  adjusts  to innovations  in the  value  of equity  hold- 
ings.  Some  consumers  respond  quickly  to  equity  innovations,  either 
because  these  consumers  have  low  D-values,  or because  they  have  a 
33. Corollary 7 gives 
2,l[,,Cll  r,,  dD 
Cov(ln[Ct+h/Ct],ln  Rt+l)  =  Io2  [e(l  +  D) -  e(1) -  e(1 -  h +  D) + e(l  -  h)] D- 
JDEIO,D]  DD 
34. The  following  approximation  for the  covariances  provides  intuition  for the  orders  of 
magnitude.  In normalized  units, 
1  (  Cth  ma  (c  h 
2  cov  In -  ,R+1  D  max  D1  . 
When  the D's are uniformly  distributed  in [O,D], 
1  C,+h  D  (  Ct  dD 
-  cov  In  ,  +1  =  cov  In -,,  ,Rt+  D 
Qo-2  \  Q  /  Jo  \,  C  D 
D  (  h  dD  -  max  1 
1 + ln-  . 
D  h 
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high  D-value  and are coincidentally  coming  up to a reset period.  Other 
consumers  respond  with  substantial  lags.  For our illustrative  example, 
the full response  will take 30 years. For low h, the 6D model predicts that 
the  covariance  profile  will  be  close  to  zero.  As  h goes  to  infinity,  the 
covariance  profile  asymptotes  to  the  prediction  of  the  instantaneous 
adjustment  model,  so  limh,,  Cov(ln[C,,h/C,],  In R,+,)  =  o02 =  0.0014. 
Figure 7 shows that our illustrative calibration of the 6D model does a fairly 
good job of matching the empirical covariances. 
This analysis  has shown  that the empirical data are completely  incon- 
sistent  with  the  standard  assumption  of  instantaneous  adjustment. 
Lagged equity returns affect consumption  growth  at very long horizons: 
Cov(ln[Ct+h/CJ,  In Rt+l), rises  slowly  with  h, instead  of quickly  plateauing 
at h = 2. This slow  rise is a key test of the 6D framework. 
We conclude  from Figure 7 that the 6D model  successfully  predicts the 
profile  of  Cov(ln[Ct+h/Ct],  In R,,,)  for  h =  1,2,  .  .  . ,25.  However,  the  6D 
model  fails to predict the profile of a closely related quantity, the normal- 
ized  Euler covariance, 
1 
__(  Ct+h_ 
-Cov  In  ,  E  In Rt+i  . 
h  \  L-t  i=l 
) 
This  h-period  covariance  generalizes  the  one-period  Euler covariance, 
Cov(ln[Ct+l/Ct],  In Rt+  ).35,36 
The standard model  with  D = 0 predicts  that the h-period normalized 
Euler covariance  will equal  [(2h -  1)/2h]]o2  for all (integer) values  of h. 
The factor (2h-1)/2h  captures time-aggregation  bias, which becomes  pro- 
portionately  less important as the horizon  increases.  By contrast,  the 6D 
modelpredicts  that, if the D's are uniformly  distributed between  0 and D 
(e.g.,  D = 30 years = 120 quarters), the h-period normalized  Euler covari- 
35. We thank Monika Piazzesi, whose insightful discussion of this paper at the NBER 
Macroeconomics  Annual Conference  led us to add analysis of the covariance  Euler 
equation  to this final draft. 
36. The Euler  covariances  link the equity premium to the coefficient  of relative  risk aver- 
sion. Consider the h-period Euler equation for a discrete-time  model with instanta- 
neous adjustment,  Et_F,[(Ct+h/C,)-5exp(ih=l  In Rt+i)]  = 1 (for  all assets a). Manipulation 
of this equation  implies 
7T 
cov([T_h=  In Rt+iJ,  In [Ct+h/Ct )h 
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ance  should  approximately37  equal  (h/4D)[3  -  2 In (h/D)] 0-2  for  h  <  D. 
For both  the  standard  model  (D  =  0) and  the  6D  model,  the  normalized 
Euler  covariance  should  rise  monotonically  with  h,  but  this  rise  should 
be  much  steeper  for  the  standard  model. 
The  empirical  data  match  neither  prediction.  In  the  twelve-country 
Campbell  data,  an initial  rise  in the  Euler  covariance  from  h =  1 to h =  7 is 
subsequently  reversed  for larger  values  of h. For h >  20,  the  Euler  covari- 
ances  are very  small  in magnitude,  with  some  negative  point  estimates.38 
This  result  seems  to  contradict  the  encouraging  results  plotted  in  Fig- 
ure  7.  To understand  this  tension,  we  assume  stationarity  and  decom- 
pose  the  h-period  Euler  covariance: 
/  h  CtC 
Cov  (n 
C  lnRt+i  Cov  (In  n Rt 
t  i=1 
+  Cov  (n  C,l  n R+  ). 
i--l  v  t-i  = 
The  h-period  Euler  covariance  (i.e.,  the  left-hand  side)  is  zero  for  large 
h's,  and  the  first  sum  on  the  right-hand  side  is  positive  (this  is  the 
quantity  plotted  in Figure  7). It follows  that  the  second  term  on  the  right- 
hand  side  should  be  negative: 
37. We use the approximation  above, 
2 cov  In  ,n  Rt+1 
-  1 + In - 
Oa2  -  + 
t  D  h  ' 
to get 
I&r  Ct+h  1  Ct 
(  ) 
h O  2cov  In  ,n  Rt  + 
.  + In Rt+h 
=  V  (  n  ,ln  R+  )  ho'2  h'o  c=l  Ct 
1  ,h'  D 
-  -  -I  1 + In -  dh' 
h JoD  1  h' 
=_  3-21n-  for  h <D 
4D  D 
D 
=  1 -  for  h >  D. 
4h 
38. See  Cochrane  and  Hansen  (1992) for an  early  empirical  analysis  of  the  multiperiod 
Euler equation.  Daniel  and Marshall (1997, 1999) report that consumption  Euler equa- 
tions  for aggregate  data  are not  satisfied  at the  quarterly  frequency  but  improve  at 
the  two-year  frequency.  Our results  are consistent  with  theirs,  but we  find  that this 
relatively  good  performance  deteriorates  as the horizon  is lengthened. The  6D Bias  and  the  Equity-Premium  Puzzle  *  295 
E  Cov (nt,  In  <  0, 
which  can be  verified  in  our sample.39 In words,  lagged  consumption 
growth  negatively  predicts  the current stock return. Such predictability 
explains  why  the Euler covariance  does  not follow  the profile predicted 
by the 6D model.  Of course,  this predictability  is inconsistent  with  any 
model in which the stock market follows  a martingale. Alternative frame- 
works,  like Campbell  and  Cochrane's  (1999) model  of habit formation, 
Barberis,  Huang,  and  Santos's  (2001) prospect-theory  model  of  asset 
pricing,  or  animal-spirits  models,  are  needed  to  explain  why  lagged 
consumption  growth  negatively  forecasts future stock returns. 
7. Conclusion 
Grossman  and Laroque (1990) argue that adjustment  costs might explain 
the  equity-premium  puzzle.  Lynch  (1996)  and  Marshall  and  Parekh 
(1999) have successfully  numerically  simulated  discrete-time  delayed  ad- 
justments  models  which  confirm  Grossman  and  Laroque's  conjecture. 
We have  described  a continuous-time  generalization  of  Lynch's  (1996) 
model.  We derive  a complete  analytic  characterization  of  the  model's 
dynamic  properties.  In addition,  our continuous-time  framework gener- 
ates  effects  that  are up  to  six  times  larger than  those  in  discrete-time 
models. 
We analyze  an  economy  composed  of  consumers  who  update  their 
consumption  every  D periods.  Using  data from our economy,  an econo- 
metrician estimating  the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) from 
the consumption  Euler equation  would  generate  a multiplicative  CRRA 
bias of 6D. Once we take account of this 6D bias, the Euler equation tests 
are unable  to reject the standard consumption  model. 
We have derived  closed-form  expressions  for the first and second  mo- 
ments  of this delayed-adjustment  economy.  The model  matches  most of 
the  empirical  moments  of  aggregate  consumption  and  equity  returns, 
including  a new test which confirms the 6D prediction that the covariance 
39. For quarterly horizons  h & {5,10,15,20,25},  the average value  of 
h-1  Co 
Cov  In  ,In Rt+1 
i=1  \)t-i 
is {-0.9,-2.0,-4.6,-2.8,-3.6}  x  10-4  for all of the countries  in the Campbell  dataset,  and 
{-1.2,-2.4,-5.0,-3.0,-3.2}  x  10-4  for the countries  with  large stock markets. 296 *  GABAIX  & LAIBSON 
between  ln(Ct+h/Ct], and Rt+1  should slowly  rise with h. The 6D model fails 
long-horizon  Euler-equation tests, but this failure is due to the interesting 
empirical  regularity that high  lagged  consumption  growth  predicts  low 
future equity  returns. 
Future work  should  test the new  empirical implications  of our frame- 
work,  including  the rich covariance  lag structure that we  have  derived. 
Most importantly,  our model  implies  that standard  Euler-equation  tests 
should  be viewed  very skeptically.  Even small positive  values  of D (e.g., 
D  =  4 quarters) dramatically  bias  the  inferences  that economists  draw 
from Euler equations  and the related Hansen-Jagannathan  bounds. 
Appendix  A. Proofs 
We  use  approximation  to  get  analytic  results.  Let  e  =  max(r,p, Or, 
o-2,o-202,  a).  For annual  data  e  8  0.05.  We shall  use  the  notation f()  = 
0<t(o),  for  k E  IR, to  mean  that f  is  measurable  with  respect  to  the 
information  known  at time  t, and there  is so -  0 and a constant  A >  0 
such  that  for  e  e sA, we  have  Eo[f2]1/2 ?  Alekl. More  concisely,  the 
norms  are in the L2  sense.  For instance: 
ert+raz(t)  1 +  -rz(t)  +  rt +  +0S(83/2) 
2 
=  1 +  oz(t)  +  Os(e)  =  1 +  Os(e1/2). 
We will often replace O<t(ek) by O(ek) when  there is a clear smallest time t 
such that f is measurable  with  respect to the information  known  at time 
t. For instance,  we  would  write  ert+(t)  =  1 +  az(t)  +  0(8)  to mean  ert+z(t)  - 
1 +  az(t)  +  0t(e). 
Also,  we  shall often use  the function 
a(i) =(1  -  lil)+.  (33) 
Finally, for z a generic standard Brownian motion,  we define Zl,  = z(j  ) 
-  z(i), and remark that 
cov(z[,_  D,i,Z,[j-D',  ) =  min  ((D 
-  (i -  j)+)+,(D'  -  (j  -  i)*)+),  (34) 
as both are equal to the measure  [i -  D,i]  n  [j -  D',j]. 
A.1 PROOF  OF PROPOSITION  1 
Denote  by  v(w)  =Efo[e-tc1-Y/(1 -  y)]dt  the  expected  value  of  the  utils 
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date is t =  0. So v(.) is the value  function  that applies  at reset dates.  Say 
that the agent puts S in the checking  account,  and the rest, w -  S, in the 
mutual fund.  Call M the (stochastic) value  of the mutual fund at time D. 
By homotheticity,  we have v(w) = vwl-Y7/(l  -  y). We have 
v(w)  =  e"  t  dt + e-PDE[v(w')]  (35) 
J  1-y 
with 
rD 
w=  M +  SerD -  ter(D-t)dt. 
Optimizing  over  ct  for t E  [0,D),  we  get  ct~ =  E [v'(w')]e(r-)(D-t),  so  that 
consumption  growth  is that  of the  Ramsey  model:  ct =  awe[(r-p)/]t  for some 
a (by the implicit-function  theorem  one can show  that it is a continuous 
function  of D,  and it has  Merton's  value  when  D  =  0). To avoid  bank- 
ruptcy, we  need  S  -  So = f0 cte-rtdt.  Imagine  that the consumer  starts by 
putting  aside  the  amount  So. Then,  he  has  to  manage  optimally  the 
remaining  amount,  w -  So. Given  some  strategy, he will end  up with  a 
stochastic  wealth  w',  and  he  has  to  solve  the  problem  of  maximizing 
vE [w'1-7/(1 -  y)]. But this is a finite-horizon  Merton problem with utility 
derived  from terminal wealth,  whose  solution  is well  known:  the whole 
amount  w -  So should  be put in a mutual  fund with  constant  rebalanc- 
ing,  with  a proportion  of  stocks  0  =  7r/(yo2). In particular,  only  the 
amount  So  is put in the checking  account. 
A.2 PROOF  OF PROPOSITION  9 
The basis of our calculations  is the representation  formula for consump- 
tion, Proposition  9. To prove  it we  shall need  the following 
LEMMA  10  We have 
wit+s =  wt{1  +  Oa'[z(t +  s)  -  z(t)]  +  O(E)}.  (36) 




Wite(r+  r- 02r2  /22)s+ao[z(t+s)-z(t)J  wit+s  =  wit 
= witl  +  -0  [z(t + s) -  z(t)] +  O(e)}.  (37) 298 *  GABAIX  & LAIBSON 
When  the  agent  checks  her portfolio  at time  T, she  puts  a fraction f = 
fD  aee-rt+[(r-P)/1]tdt  =  0(e)  in  the  checking  account,  so  that 
i+ = w-(1  -f)  (38) 
=  w,[1  +  0(e)].  (39) 
Pasting together  (37) and (39) at different  time intervals,  we see that (37) 
holds  between  two  arbitrary dates  (i.e.,  possibly  including  reset dates)  t 
and t + s, and the lemma is proven. 
We can now  proceed  to the 
PROOF  OF PROPOSITION  9  Say  that  i  E  [O,D] has  her  latest  reset  point 
before  t -  1 at ti =  t -  1 -  i. The  following  reset  points  are  ti +  mD  for m 
>  1, and for s -  t -  1 we have [the first 0(e)  term capturing the determin- 
istic increase of consumption  between  reset dates] 
(  Witj +  t  (Wii,+mD 
- 
Witi+(m-1)D)lsti+mD  [1  +  0(e)] 
a  m>_l  / 
Wti 
+  E  Witi[  0'Z[ti+(m-1)D,ti+mD]+?O()]ls>ti+mD+O(E)/ 
m>l 
so  that,  using  the  notation  im 
= 
witiOZ[ti+(m-_)D,ti+mD], 
fTC  ds + 0(e)  =  (T -  ti)wit + 
T 
1m 
lst+mD  ds 
ti  a  m21  ti 
=  (T -  ti)witi +  ,im(T 
-  (ti +  mD))+ 
m>1 
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a  t+l  f  t  ttt-l 
cit+  -  ct  +  0(e)  =  (  -2  +  c  )  cis  ds 
=  C  im[(t +  1 -  Tim)+ -  2(t  -  Tim) +(t  -  1-  Tim)+] 
m21 
rim=ti+mD 
=  a  vjma(t  -  (ti +  mD)), 
m>l 
since  (x  +  1)  -  2x+  +  (x  -  1)+  =  a(x) 
=  a  E  ,ma(1  +  i -  mD), 
m>1 
because  ti =  t -  1 -  i. 
Let wt- D  =  Wi0,t  -D-  which  implies  that wi, -D-  =  Wt-D-i[l  +  0(e)]  for all 
i.  Note  that  io is  an  arbitrarily selected  index  value.  We now  get  the 
expression  for consumption  growth, 
rD  di 
Ct+  -  Ct =  (cit+l -  Cit) 
Jo  -  D 
= Oa 
ft-D-00z[t-l-i+(m-l)D,t-l-i+mD]a(1  +  i  - 
mD)D  +  0(e). 
Defining  j  D  -  1  -  i,  and  noting  that  the  above  expressions  paste 
together,  we have 
Ct+1 -  Ct  1  dj 
OWD 
1= 
O0Z[t+j-D,t+ja(j)-  +0(E).  awt-1  J_1  D 
One can likewise  calculate 
Ct  =  1 +  0(i), 
aWt-D-1 
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__i  r1  dj 
In 
=  0-  Z[t+j_D,t+j]a(j)D+  0(e).  ct  J-1  D 
A.3 PROOF  OF THEOREM  2 
Use Proposition  9, In Rt+1  = 
-Z[t,t+l]  +  0(e),  to get 
cov  In -,n  Rt+l )  02  a(i) cov  (Z[t+i-D,t+i],,Z[tt+l]  ) 
+  O<t(3/2) 
with 
1ri~~~~~~  d  i  di 
a(i) cov  (Z[t+i.Dt+i,t,t+l])  D  -=  a(i)min(D,i)  -  by (34) 
D 
3(1 -  D) + D2 
~~= /if  D_1 
6 
1 
=-  if  D  1. 
6D 
Using  (1) and (6), this leads  to the expression  (2). 
A.4 PROOF  OF THEOREM  3 
First we need 
LEMMA  11  We  have, with d defined  in (11),for D E R, 
a(i)a(i +  D) di=  d"(D). 
PROOF  OF  LEMMA  11  Define,  for D E R, 
g(D)  f  a(i)a(i +  D)di.  (40) 
First, note  that g is even because  a is. In addition,  for D 2  2, g(D)  =  0: 
for the integrand  to be nonzero  in (40), we need both li[ <  1 and Ii + DI < 
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For a general D, we  derive  (in the sense  of the theory of distributions, 
with  Dirac's 8function40) g over D, starting from (40): 
g4)(D)  =  f  a(i)a(4)(i + D)di 
= f  a"(i)a"(i  +  D)di  by integration  by parts 
=  J  (-1)J(j  -  2 + D) 
by direct calculation  (or combinatorial  insight)  using  a"(x) =  8(x +  1) - 
28(x) +  8(x -  1). We now  integrate g(4)(D),  which  gives 
g(D)  =  (  )  j -  2  +  D1  +  +  bjDJ 
j=0  /  2  x  3!  j=0 
3 
= d"  (D) +  bjDj, 
j=0 
where  the bj  are integration  constants.  But the condition g(D) = 0 for D 
2 forces the bj's  to be 0, which  concludes  the proof. 
The rest of the proof is in two steps.  First we prove  (41)-(42),  then we 
calculate this expression  of p(D,t). 
Step 1. Using  (25) at t and t + h, we  get 
cov  (n  n Ct+l+h  -22F(D,h)  +  0(Ch2) 
V  Ct  t+h 
with 
40. Dirac's g-function is equal to 0 everywhere  except at 0, where  8(0) =  o. 302 *  GABAIX & LAIBSON 
((r  di  Il 
F(D,h) = cov  a(i)z[t+i-D,t+i] 
- 
/  j  a)Zt+  D,th+  j]  I  D-i  gI  t-1 
l 
' 





so using  (34) we  get 
p(D,h) 
r(D,h)  = p 
D2 
with 
p(D,h)  f  f  a(i)a(j)(D -  ii -  j -  hl)+  di dj. 
i,jE[-  1,1l] 
(41) 
(42) 
Step 2. Our next step is to calculate p(D,h). Start with the case D >  h + 2: 
then  (D -  Ii -  j -  h)+  = D -  i -  j -  hi, as ii -  j -  hi  - 1 + 1 + h c  D), 
and given fI  jfij[1,1a(i)aj)  di dj = (ie[-,  1]  a(i) di) (fi[-l1]a(j)  dj) = 1, we get 
p(D,h) =  D -  A(h) 
with 
A(h) =-  i -  j 
for  D  h  +  2 
j -  hla(i)a(j)  di dj. 
Going back to a general D >  0, we  get from (42) 
p"(D) =  f  f  a(i)a(j)  (D -  ii -  j -  hl)di dj 
ijGR 
=  f  (iD  -h)  + a(i -  D -  h)]di 
=  f  a(i)[a(i + D -  h) + a(i + D + h)]di, 
because  a is even  and by an application  of change  in variables.  So from 
Lemma 11, p"(D) = d"(D -  h) + d"(D + h), and 
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p(D,h) = d(D + h) + d(D -  h) + do + d1D 
for some  real numbers  do, dl. Equation (43) gives us d, = 0, since d'(x) =  ? 
for x  >  2.  Finally, p(O) =  0 gives  A(h)  =  -do  =  d(h) +  d(-h),  which 
concludes  the proof. 
A.5 PROOF  OF COROLLARY  4 
F(D,0)  is monotonic  by direct calculation  from the result in Theorem 3. 
Theorem 3 also implies 
2  D2  D3 
F(D,O)  ---+-for  DE[0,1]. 
3  6  20 
Alternatively,  this result can be obtained  more directly from the calcula- 
tion at the end  of the proof of Theorem 3. 
A.6 PROOF  OF PROPOSITION  5 
Extend the argument  used  to prove  Theorem 2. To calculate the correla- 
tion coefficient,  use the variance results from Corollary 4. 
A.7 PROOF  OF THEOREM  6 
Because  V(sl,s2) =  V(sl,1) -  V(s2,1), it is enough  to fix s2 =  1. We use the 
notation  s = sl. Recall (25), so that 
cov  ( In[tt+  lnR[t+st+l  =  W(s) +  0(3/2) 
C[t-i,t]  D 
with 
rs  I1  di 
W(s) =  D  a(i) cov  (z[t+i-D,t+i],Z[t+s,t+l]) 
= a(i) (i-  max(i -  D,s))di.  (44) 
So, using  the Heaviside  function-H(x)  1 if x -  0, 0 if x <  0 (so that 
H'  =  8)- 
W'(s) =  -  a(i)H (i 
-  max(i -  D,s)) H(s -  i +  D)di 
=  -  f  a(i)H (i -  s)H(s  -  i + D)di 304 *  GABAIX  & LAIBSON 
and 
W"(s) =  f  a(i)[8(i -  s)H(s -  i +  D) -  8(s -  i +  D)H(i -  s)] di 
=  a(s) -  a(s + D). 
Introducing  the function  e defined  in (15), which  satisfies  e" = a, we  get 
W(s) = e(s) -  e(s + D) +  Wo +  Wls  (45) 
for some  constants  W0,  W.  Observe  that for s -  1, (44) gives  W(s) = 0, so 
(45) gives  us  W,  =  0 (and  W0 =  D/2).  This  allows  us  to  conclude  the 
proposition. 
A.8 PROOF  OF COROLLARY  7 
Immediate  application  of the preceding  theorem. 
A.9 PROOF  OF THEOREM  8 
The expression  (23) is derived  exactly as in Proposition  9. The only new 
work is to calculate F(D,D',h).  Using  (34), we  get 
p(D,D',h) 
F(D,D'.h)  = 
DD' 
with 
p(D,D',h)  =  a(i)a(j)min((D  -  (i -  -  h)+)+,(D' -  (j -  i + h)+)+ di dj. 
ji,E[-l,l] 
To calculate  p, we  derive  (again,  H(x)  =  1,o  is Heaviside's  function) 
PD'  =  a(i)a(j)H (((D  -  (i -  j -  h)+)+ -  (D' -  (j -  i + h)+)+ 
H(D'  -  (j -  i + h)+)di dj 
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PD'D'  =  fa(i)a(j)H  ((D -(i  -  j -  h)+)+ -  (D'  -  (  -  i + h)+)+ 
(D'  -  (j -i  + h)+)didj 
-  a(i)a(j)8 ((D -  (i -  j - 
h)) 
-  (D' -  (j -  i + h))+) 
H(D'  -  (j -  i+  h)+)didj 
=  a(i)[a(i + D'  -  h) -  a(i +  D'  -  D -  h)]di. 
So Lemma 11 gives 
p =  d(D' -  h) -  d(D' -  D -  h) + eo + elD', 
where  e0,el are functions  of D and  h. As p =  0 for D'  =  0, we  get e  = 
-d(-h)  +  d(-D  -  h) =  -d(h)  +  d(D  +  h), as d is even.  As we  should 
have p(D,D,h)  = p(D,h) for p in (42), we  can conclude  el = 0 and deduce 
the value  of e0, so Theorem  8 is proven. 
A.10 DERIVATION  OF THE  UTILITY  LOSSES 
A  fully  rigorous  derivation,  e.g.  of  the  type  used  by  Rogers  (2001), is 
possible  here.  Such a derivation  begins  with  the Bellman equation  (35), 
and  then  uses  a Taylor expansion  to  derive  an expression  for v of the 
type  v  =  vo +  vlD  +  O(v2). This approach  is tedious  and  not  very  in- 
structive  about  the  economic  origins  of  the  losses,  which  is  why  we 
present  the following  more heuristic proof. 
Equation  (28) is  standard  (e.g.,  see  Cochrane,  1989).  For complete- 
ness's  sake,  though,  let  us  mention  a way  to  derive  it.  We  want  to 
calculate  U(C)  -  U(C'),  where  C  =  (c)t,,0  is  the  optimum  vector  of 
(stochastic)  consumption  flows,  U(C) =  E[fle-Ptu(ct)],  and  C' is another 
vector  that can be bought  with  the same Arrow-Debreu  prices p. For C 
and C' close,  we have 
AU-  U(C')  -  U(C) 
C' -  C 
= U'(C)(C'  -  C)  +  (C'  -  C)'  U"(C)  2  +  0((C  -  C)3). 
By optimality  of C we have  U'(C) = Ap  for some p, and pC = pC' = initial 
wealth  = W; thus we have  U'(C) (C -  C') = 0. Expressing  U"  finally gives 306 *  GABAIX  & LAIBSON 
U  =  -  E  fe-  tu"(ct)(ct  -  c)2 dt 
2  _ 
A change  AW in the initial wealth  creates,  by homotheticity  of the opti- 
mal  policy,  a change  in  consumption  ACt/ct =  AW/W,  hence  a change  in 
utility 
-AW 
AU  =  E  e-P'tu(c  )c-  dt 
W  _ 
So  the  suboptimality  of  plan  C' is  equivalent  to  a wealth  loss  [using 
u'(c) =  c-]  of 
A/W  1 E[oe-u"(ct)c2  (  C t  2dt] 
--.-  1  ct 
=C-  W  2  E [fIe-Ptu'(c)ct  dt] 
y  /  (Ct  -C  ) 
2 
2U  ct  )  ) 
where the weights  in the mean <  > are given by <X,>  = E [fo  e-'cl-"YXtdt]  / 
E [fo e-Pct -  dt]. This proves  equation  (28). 
We now  derive  <Ac2/c2>,  with Act  = c' -  ct. With latest reset at time r, 
Ac,  c -  ce  -t  c  =  (W' -  Wt)[1  +  0(E)]  a  a 
= 
(wT-  wt +  W  -  w)[1  +  0(e)]. 
Now  application  of  Lemma  10  gives  (sparing  the  reader  the  tedious 
derivation), 
(Wr- 
Wt)2  =  E 
K  -?fo(fo  t )2 
dt -  2) 
02  +(D2D 
-  +0(e2) 
2 
Defining  I such that E[cl-I  = c -Ye-  t, with  T  >  0, we  get The  6D Bias  and  the  Equity-Premium  Puzzle  *  307 
((W  -  wr)2  /t)  =  (Ca202o2tD) 
=  a202cr2DfO  e-  'tt dt 
Jf e- etdt 
=  a202r2D  /I, 
=  02 o2DO(e)  =  0(82). 
The  cross  term  ((w,  -  wt)(w'  -  w))  =  0. 
So we have the important  (and general in these kinds of problems) fact 
that the first-order contribution  to the welfare loss is the direct impact of 
the delayed  adjustment-the  w, -  wt term-whereas  the indirect impact 
(where  a suboptimal  choice  of consumption  creates modifications  in fu- 
ture wealth)  is second  order. In other terms, 
(At/Ct)  =  (C  t/C t)without  modification  of the wealth  process +  0(e2) 
=  ((W,  -  wt)2/v2)  +  O(82) 
=  02o2D/2  +  O(e2). 
Using  (28), we  get (29). 
Appendix  B. Model  with  Immediate  Adjustment  in 
Response  to Large  Changes  in Equity  Prices 
Suppose  that people  pay greater attention  to "large" movements  in the 
stock  markets  (because  they  are  more  salient,  or  because  it  is  more 
rational to do so).  How  does  our bias change? We propose  the following 
tractable way  to answer  this question.  Say that the returns in the stock 
market are 
dRt =  (A, +  r) dt +  cr  dzt +  djt 
where  jt is a jump  process  with  arrival rate A. For instance,  such jumps 
may  correspond  to crashes,  or to "sharp corrections,"  though  we  need 
not have  E[djt] <  0. To be specific,  when  a crash arrives, the return falls 
by J (to fix ideas,  say J = 0.1-0.3).  To model high attention to crashes,  we 
say that consumption  adjusts to dzt shocks  every  D periods,  and adjusts 
to dj shocks  immediately  (D = 0 for those  Poisson  events). 
Denote  by o2 the variance of Brownian shocks,  and by or' =  E[dj2]  /dt 
= A2 the variance of jump shocks.  The total variance of the stock market 308 *  GABAIX  & LAIBSON 
is  a2  -=  2  =  (2  +  o,  assuming  for simplicity  that  the  two  types  of 
shocks  are independent.  The equity premium  is Xr  =  L -  AJ.  By writing 
down  the standard value  function  for the Merton problem,  one sees that 
the optimal  equity  share,  0, is now  the solution  of a nonlinear  equation 
T -  yo20  -  A  A[(1  -  OJ)--  1] =  0. 
For tractability, we  use  the approximation  J <<  1 (which  is reasonable, 
since  a typical  value  for J is  0.1  to  0.25).  We get  the  analogue  of  the 
simple  formula (1): 
IT 
0  2 
Yo-tot 
plus higher-order  terms in J. One can show  that formula (22), which  was 
derived  in the  case  of assets  with  Brownian  shocks,  carries over to the 
case of a mix of Brownian  shocks and jumps.  Thus we get, to first order, 
I 
_  (  a2  1  a2  1 
-I  + 
y  \7ot2b(D)  Ua2t  b(0) 
with  b(0) =  2 and  ra2t =  o2  +  (-.  Thus,  the  new  bias is the  harmonic 
mean of the b(D) = 6D (if D  -  1) bias for "normal" Brownian shocks,  and 
the shorter b(0) =  2 bias of the Brownian shocks. 
As  a numerical  illustration,  say  a "jump" corresponds  to  a monthly 
change  in the stock market of more than J = 25% in absolute  value.  This 
corresponds,  empirically,  to  an  estimate  of  A =  0.53%/year (5 months 
since  1925), i.e.  a crash every  14 years.  Then  a2  AJ  =  2/  =  0.014.  o'l/O'tot  A 
Take D  =  4 quarters as a baseline.  The new  '/y becomes  20.6,  which  is 
close to the old ratio of 24. 
Appendix  C:  Expression  of the  Bias  in the  Lynch  Setup 
when  D -  1 
In Lynch's  (1996) discrete-time  setup,  agents  consume  every  month  and 
adjust their portfolio  every  T months.  The econometric  observation  pe- 
riod is time-aggregated  periods  of F months,  so D =  T/F. 
Say consumer  i E {1,  .  . . ,T} adjusts her consumption  at i +  nT, n E 
Z. Say the econometrician  looks at period  1, ...  ,F}. The aggregate  per 
capita consumption  over this period  is The  6D Bias  and  the  Equity-Premium  Puzzle  *  309 
1  T  F 
CF  =  T  Ci.S  (46) 
i=  s=l 
The returns are 
F 
In RF =  rs,  (47) 
s=l 
where  r, =  In RS. Call C,i =  sF= cis the  consumption  of  agent  i in  the 
period. 
For i >  F, cov(CiF,ln RF) =  0, because  agent  i did not adjust her con- 
sumption  during the period. 
For 1 -  i c  F, we have cit  = 1 + 0(e)  (normalizing) when  t < i, and ci  = 
1  +  0=  1rs +  O(e) when  t  -  i,  where  the  O(e) terms  incorporate  the 
deterministic  part of consumption  growth.  The stochastic  part, in rs, has 
the  order of magnitude  r =  O(e/2),  and  dominates  those  terms.  Infor- 
mation  about  stock  returns  up  to  i will  affect  only  consumption  from 
time  i to  F,  so,  denoting  by  ACiF  the  difference  in  total  consumption 
between  a given  period  of length  F and the previous  one, 
cov(ACiF,  In RF) =  cov  (F +  1 -  i)0  rs,  rs 
s=l  s= 
=  ao2i(F+  1-  i)  for  1  ii  F. 
So 
cov(CF,,ln  RF)  =  o2i(F  +  1  -i)ll_iF  Ti=l 
0or2 F 
= T-  (F+  1)i-  i 
T  i=1 
0oa2  F(  + 1)  FF  + 1)(2F +  1)(2F  +  1) 
T  2  6 
=02  F(F  +  1)(F  +  2) 
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But  given  that  the  mean  per-period  consumption  c,t  =  1  +  0(1e/2),  the 
aggregate  consumption  is  CF =  F +  O<o(1/2),  and 
cov(ACF/CF,ln  RF)  cov(ACF,ln RF)/F 
(F +  1)(F + 2) 
6T 
The  naive  econometrician  would  predict  cov(ACF/CF,  In RF) =  0a2F. 
The econometrician  estimating  =  7rF/cov(ACF/CF,ln  RF)  will  get a bias 
[with D =  T/F and as 0 =  7r/(yo-2)]  of 
_  6F2  - =  D  .  (48) 
y  (F +  1)(F + 2) 
Holding  D constant,  the  continuous-time  limit corresponds  to F --  , 
and  we  find  the  value  y/y  =  6D.  The discrete-time  case  where  agents 
would  consume  at every  econometric  period  corresponds  to F =  1, and 
then  one gets  y/y  =  D, which  can be easily derived  directly. 
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1.  Introduction 
Gabaix  and  Laibson  extend  some  earlier  work  examining  the  effects  of 
infrequent  consumption  decision-making  by  individuals.  Grossman  and 
Laroque  (1990)  developed  a continuous-time  model  in which  an  individ- 
ual  adjusts  consumption  infrequently  because  of  proportional  adjust- 
ment  costs.  Marshall  and  Parekh  (1999)  present  numerical  results  for  an 
economy  composed  of heterogeneous  agents  behaving  in this  way.  Cali- Comment  *  313 
brating  equity  returns  to  U.S.  data,  they  find  that  undetectably  small 
consumption  adjustment  costs  can alleviate  the equity-premium  puzzle 
by delivering  the low volatility  of aggregate consumption  growth  and its 
low correlation with  equity return found  in U.S.  data. 
Agents  facing  proportional  adjustment  costs  use  a  state-dependent 
decision  rule. As an alternative,  Lynch  (1996) examined  an economy  in 
which  decisions  are  made  at  fixed  intervals  and  are  unsynchronized 
across  agents.  Agents  choose  nondurable  consumption  and  portfolio 
composition,  and  either  or both  can  be  chosen  infrequently.  A  small 
utility  cost  is  associated  with  both  decisions  being  made  infrequently. 
Calibrating  returns  to the  U.S.  economy,  Lynch  (1996) also  found  that 
less frequent and unsynchronized  decision  making delivers the low vola- 
tility of aggregate  consumption  growth  and its low  correlation with  eq- 
uity return found  in U.S.  data. Allowing  portfolio  rebalancing  to occur 
every  period  has  a negligible  effect  on  the joint behavior  of aggregate 
consumption  and returns. 
Gabaix  and  Laibson  present  a  continuous-time  generalization  of 
Lynch's  model  and  are able  to obtain  analytic  expressions  for the bias 
to  risk  aversion  imparted  by  less  frequent  consumption  adjustments. 
The paper  also calibrates a version  of the model  that incorporates  tem- 
poral  aggregation,  delayed  adjustment,  and  nonparticipation  in stocks 
by a fraction of the  agents.  Consistent  with  the  results  in Lynch  (1996) 
and  Marshall  and  Parekh  (1999),  Gabaix  and  Laibson  also  find  that  a 
delayed-consumption-adjustment  model  can  help  explain  the  equity- 
premium  puzzle  by  producing  lower  consumption-growth  volatility 
and  lower  contemporaneous  covariance  of  consumption  growth  with 
equity  returns. 
Although  not modeled  explicitly by Lynch or by Gabaix and Laibson, 
constant  decision  intervals  arise when  it is costly  to gather information 
about  wealth  innovations  and  to  solve  optimization  problems.  Duffie 
and Sun (1990) presented  a model  of this type and showed  that if utility 
is power,  risky-asset  return is in geometric  Brownian motion,  and trans- 
action costs  are proportional  to wealth,  then  the optimal  decision  inter- 
val is a constant. 
This discussion  first describes  the model  and summarizes  some  of its 
key implications.  Then the calibration and empirical work are discussed. 
Finally, some  general comments  and conclusions  are presented. 
2. Model  Setup  and  Main  Results 
The economy  has a riskless rate r and a risky return that follows  geomet- 
ric Brownian motion  with an instantaneous  mean return of 7r + r and an 314 *  LYNCH 
instantaneous  variance of o-2.  Agents  have power  utility and adjust con- 
sumption  every  D periods.  At each adjustment  time,  agents  set aside an 
amount  for  consumption  over  the  next  D  periods,  which  earns  the 
riskless  rate r until consumed.  The agents  place their remaining  wealth 
in  an  investment  portfolio  that  is  continuously  rebalanced.  Thus,  the 
optimal  risky-asset  weight  0 is same  as in the  D  =  0 case:  0 =  r/(,y(2). 
The economy  has a continuum  of agents,  indexed  by adjustment  times, 
which  are uniformly  distributed  over any interval of length  D. 
When  D =  0, the econometrician  still faces temporal aggregation.  The 
variance of log per-period  aggregate consumption  growth is 
2 of instanta- 
neous  volatility when  D = 0, is declining  in D, and is approximately  1/D 
times  instantaneous  volatility  when  D  is  large.  Instantaneous  log 
consumption-growth  autocorrelation  is  0  at  all  lags  when  D  =  0.  In 
contrast,  because  of temporal  aggregation,  log per-period  consumption 
growth  autocorrelation  when  D  =  0 is  4  at lag 1 and  is 0 at lags  of 2 or 
more.  With temporal  aggregation  and  D >  0, log per-period  consump- 
tion  growth  autocorrelation  is positive  and  decreasing  in lag length  at 
lags less than D + 2 and is 0 at lags of D + 2 or more. The instantaneous 
contemporaneous  covariance  of log consumption  growth  with log risky- 
asset return with  D = O is 0o2.  The contemporaneous  covariance  of log 
per-period  consumption  growth with log per-period  risky-asset  return is 
0Oo2/2  with  D  =  0 and is  0oa2/(6D) with  D >  1. Finally, with  D  =  0, the 
instantaneous  covariance  of  log  consumption  growth  with  lagged  log 
risky-asset  return  is 0 at all lags  >  0, while  the  covariance  of log  per- 
period  consumption  growth  with  lagged  log  per-period  risky-asset  re- 
turn is positive  at lags less than 2 and is 0 at lags of 2 or more. Once D > 
1, the covariance  of log per-period  consumption  growth with lagged  log 
per-period  risky-asset  return is positive  at lags less than D + 2 and is 0 at 
lags of D + 2 or more. 
To  summarize,  the  contemporaneous  covariance  of  consumption 
growth  with  risky-asset  return is lower  than instantaneous  due  to tem- 
poral  aggregation  alone,  lower  still due  to infrequent  adjustment,  and 
decreasing  in D. The variance  of consumption  growth  is lower  than the 
instantaneous  variance due  to temporal  aggregation  alone,  is lower  still 
due to infrequent  adjustment,  and is decreasing  in D. The covariance  of 
consumption  growth  with  lagged  consumption  growth  and with  lagged 
risky-asset  return is positive  for lags less  than 2 due  to temporal  aggre- 
gation  alone,  and  in  general  is  positive  for lags  less  than  D  +  2 and 
zero otherwise. 
While the paper typically  fixes the lag or the period  length  and varies 
D, it would  be useful  to examine  what  happens  to the various  statistics Comment 315 
of interest  as the lag or the period  length  is varied for fixed D. Such an 
analysis  would  be helpful  for generating  testable implications,  since one 
particular distribution  for D holds  empirically. 
The paper's  assumption  that agents  continuously  rebalance  their in- 
vestment  portfolios  seems  inconsistent  with  a fixed adjustment  interval, 
since  the  assumed  fixed  interval  between  consumption  adjustments  is 
difficult to justify when  agents  know  the risky-asset  return. The paper's 
closed-form  solutions  rely on continuous  portfolio rebalancing by agents. 
Restricting the  ability of an agent  to rebalance her portfolio  within  her 
adjustment  period may affect the distribution  of aggregate  consumption 
growth.  In an  economy  with  infinite-lived  agents  making  unsynchro- 
nized  consumption  and portfolio  decisions  every  D periods,  the cross- 
sectional  distribution  of  agent  wealth  (expressed  as  a fraction  of  total 
wealth)  becomes  increasingly  disperse  over time,  indicating  that aggre- 
gate consumption  growth  does not have a steady-state  distribution.  This 
concern  prompted  Lynch  (1996)  to  build  an  overlapping-generations 
economy  with  finite-lived  individuals  and  a deterministically  growing 
wealth endowment  for each period's newborn.  Lynch finds that the impli- 
cations  for aggregate  consumption  growth  of infrequent  consumption 
adjustments  are  largely  unaffected  by  the  portfolio-rebalancing  fre- 
quency  of agents. 
3.  Calibration  and  Empirical  Work 
Gabaix and Laibson estimate  D based on a cost of adjusting consumption 
of 0.04% of wealth and obtain an estimate of 2 years. This estimate is likely 
to  overstate  D,  since  their  calculations  assume  continuous  portfolio 
rebalancing.  The paper then calibrates a simple macro model  with share- 
holders  who  delay consumption  and nonshareholders  who  do not delay. 
The calibration makes many simplifying  assumptions:  both groups  have 
the  same  propensity  to consume,  and  the  wealth  of the  two  groups  is 
assumed  to be uncorrelated.  Some  sensitivity  analysis  would  be useful. 
While  the  endogenous  adjustment  period  is calculated  to be 2 years, 
the  calibrated  model  has  a  continuum  of  agents  and  D  is  uniformly 
distributed  from 0 to 30 years.  This switch  is not innocuous.  For exam- 
ple,  the empirical section  attempts  to explain  the pattern of covariances 
between  equity  Rt+1  and  ln(Ct+h/Ct) as a function  of h. The paper  uses 
quarterly data for this  section  and  finds  these  covariances  are roughly 
increasing  in h out to at least 20 quarters, particularly for countries  with 
large  stock  markets.  This model  generates  the  upward-sloping  pattern 
out  to  at  least  20  quarters  that  is  found  in  the  data.  But  this  result 316 *  LYNCH 
depends  critically on  D taking  values  out  to at least  20 quarters.  If the 
paper used the calibrated adjustment period of D = 8 quarters, the covari- 
ance pattern would  be flat for h-  10 quarters. 
In the calibration section,  the paper only compares  the model  with the 
data  on  consumption  growth's  volatility,  contemporaneous  covariance 
with  return,  and  first-lag  autocorrelation.  Then,  the  empirical  section 
attempts  to explain  the  pattern  of covariances  between  equity  Rt,,  and 
ln(Ct+h/Ct)  and the pattern of h-period Euler equations,  both as functions 
of h. However,  the distinction between  the paper's calibration and empiri- 
cal work seems  artificial. Since the model  also provides  many  other mo- 
ments  that could be compared  with  the data, it would  be useful  to cali- 
brate a model  and then  examine  how  it performs with  respect to a wide 
range of moments  for aggregate consumption  growth.  A more systematic 
analysis  would  be instructive.  It would  also be useful  to have  standard 
errors for the  data estimates  as part of such  an analysis.  One  approach 
simulates  samples  using  the model  and calculates  a distribution  for the 
statistic  of interest.  This distribution  can then  be  used  to calculate  a p- 
value  for the data estimate  under the null that the model  holds. 
For example,  the paper  does  not examine  consumption-growth  auto- 
correlations beyond  the first lag, even though  the model provides  predic- 
tions about them.  Heaton  (1993) finds negative  autocorrelation  at the 5th 
lag  for  quarterly  seasonally  adjusted  consumption  changes,  negative 
autocorrelation  at the  1st and 4th lags  for monthly  seasonally  adjusted 
consumption  changes,  and negative  autocorrelation  at the 1st, 2nd,  and 
5th  lags  for  quarterly  non-seasonally-adjusted  consumption  changes. 
Negative  autocorrelation  at any  lag is inconsistent  with  the  model.  So 
despite  the  likely  role  being  played  by  measurement  error, Heaton's 
results  are challenges  for the paper's  delayed-consumption-adjustment 
model.  Thus,  while  a useful  first step,  the  empirical  work  is  far from 
conclusive,  and  more  needs  to  be  done  to  ascertain  whether  delayed 
consumption  adjustment  is playing  a role in the  U.S.  economy  and  in 
other economies. 
4.  General  Comments  and  Conclusions 
The assumption  of a predetermined  delay interval D is difficult to justify. 
At  the  very  least,  agents  are likely  to  adjust  consumption  after  large 
changes  in equity value.  While this effect causes  all investors  to adjust at 
the same time (see,  for example,  Marshall and Parekh, 1999), Gabaix and 
Laibson find the upward bias to risk aversion can still be large. However, 
their adjustment  trigger of 25% monthly  return in absolute value  is quite 
extreme,  and the upward bias associated  with a more modest and reason- Comment 317 
able trigger point  is likely to be much  smaller. A model  in which  inves- 
tors adjust consumption  after a large change  in equity  value  is empiri- 
cally distinguishable  from the fixed-decision-interval  model.  The former 
predicts  that the standard  Euler equation  should  perform well  in those 
periods  that  are  preceded  by  a  period  with  a  large  equity  return  in 
absolute  value.  Empirical work  is needed  to  characterize  the  delayed- 
adjustment  rule (if any) being  used  by agents  in the U.S.  economy  and 
other economies. 
The model  assumes  that equity  value  is in geometric  Brownian  mo- 
tion.  There  is  much  evidence  that  equity  returns  are predictable  and 
heteroscedastic.  The implication  may be a delay interval D that depends 
on the same variables that forecast means  and variances. 
It seems unlikely that agents always take recent wealth innovations  into 
account  when  making  high-frequency  consumption  decisions.  Gabaix 
and Laibson's analytical results serve to emphasize  the potentially  large 
effect of such behavior on the joint distribution of aggregate consumption 
and equity return. Hopefully,  their work will prompt more theoretical and 
especially  empirical  work  directed  toward  understanding  how  agents 
delay  adjusting  their consumption  and how  this delay  affects aggregate 
consumption  in the U.S.  and other countries. 
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mium  in postwar  data,  at least for "reasonable parameters"  for the  en- 
dowment  process  and the  coefficient  of relative  risk aversion  y. This is 
the equity-premium  puzzle  stated by Mehra and Prescott (1985). Simply 
increasing  y (and  somehow  arguing  that this is "reasonable") does  not 
solve  the puzzle,  because  a high  y counterfactually  leads  to a high  risk- 
free rate. The few models  in the literature today  that may be considered 
puzzle-free  still rely on high  y's.  An example  is Campbell  and Cochrane 
(1999), who  use  an  average  y of  50.  An  argument  that  relies  on  esti- 
mation  bias  for  y alone,  as suggested  by  the  title  of the  paper,  cannot 
therefore be enough  to reconcile  the standard  model  with  the data. But 
there is more to the model  of Gabaix and Laibson than the title indicates, 
because  it is populated  by agents  whose  heterogeneity  matters. 
The high equity premium  and the low risk-free rate are, literally speak- 
ing,  no  puzzles  in  the  model:  asset  prices  are  specified  exogenously. 
The endogenous  variables in this model  are the consumption  processes 
of  individual  investors.  By summing  these  over  a group  of  investors, 
the paper obtains  a measure  of aggregate  consumption.  The interpreta- 
tion  of  this  portfolio  choice  model,  or Merton  model,  as a production 
economy  with  exogenous  production  technologies  (or as a small  open 
economy)  leads  to another  endogenous  variable: net borrowing  by this 
group  of investors  (or the  current account).  The behavior  of these  en- 
dogenous  variables  (consumption  and  net  borrowing)  is what  is  puz- 
zling  in models  with  exogenous  returns  (such as Constantinides,  1990). 
My discussion  will  thus  concentrate  on  the  model-implied  behavior  of 
these  endogenous  variables. 
The model  is a continuous-time  version  of Lynch  (1996). Agents  are 
indexed  by  a first adjustment  time  i and  an interval length  Di between 
adjustments,  which  together  define  an  (exogenous)  adjustment  se- 
quence  {i, i + Di, i + 2Di, . . . }. Between  adjustment  times  [i + jD,  i + (j 
+ 1)Di), j E N, agents  do not know  the returns of risky assets and do not 
trade  them.  This  feature  makes  assets  illiquid.  As  in  a  limited- 
participation model,  the Euler equations  for only a subset  of agents hold 
at any point  in time t in this economy.  With adjustment  delays,  the first- 
order conditions  for risky-asset  holdings  at time  t are only  satisfied  for 
those  agents  that  are adjusting  at time  t. The  intuition  from  a closed- 
economy  version  of this model  tells us that in this case agents need  to be 
compensated  to hold these  illiquid assets.  The resulting  equity premium 
is not so much  a risk premium  in the usual  sense  as a liquidity premium. 
We need  to be careful, however,  in applying  closed-economy  intuition 
to  this  setup,  because  it  is  not  clear  whether  the  implications  of  the 
model  will  survive  in  a  closed-economy  setting.  The  reason  is  that 
agents  in  the  model  continuously  observe  the  riskless  rate,  which  is Comment 319 
assumed  to be constant.  In a closed  economy,  the riskless rate responds  to 
stock-market  movements and  therefore  reveals  information  from  other 
agents  in the  economy  (who  get  to adjust  their consumption  earlier in 
response  to these movements).  This means  that even  agents  who  do not 
directly  observe  stock  returns  can infer from  the  riskless  rate whether 
the  stock  market  just  tanked  and  thus  can  adjust  their  consumption 
immediately.  The  closed-economy  version  of  the  model  with  learning 
will be more difficult to solve,  but future research will hopefully  tell us 
how  it behaves. 
The puzzles  lie in the numbers,  so I will compare the model's  implica- 
tion with  the joint time  series  of quarterly U.S.  aggregate  consumption 
and real stock returns.  I will  show  that adjustment  delays  alone cannot 
provide  an explanation  for the  equity  premium.  The model  fails along 
three main  dimensions:  (i) consumption  growth  from the  model  is too 
autocorrelated,  (ii) the normalized  covariance of returns with  consump- 
tion  monotonically  increases  with  horizon  in  the  model,  while  it  is 
hump-shaped  in  the  data  with  a peak  at 2 years,  and  (iii) returns  are 
assumed  to be i.i.d.,  while  they are predictable in the data. 
The reason for (i) is that stock-market shocks trigger a series of individ- 
ual consumption  adjustments  in the same  direction by agents  who  only 
get  to  adjust  later to  the  shock.  The resulting  aggregate  consumption 
growth  process  thus  looks  autocorrelated  and  predictable  by  stock  re- 
turns.  The model  does  not seem  to generate  too much predictability  for 
consumption,  but it does  imply  too much  autocorrelation  for consump- 
tion growth. 
The  reason  for  (ii) is  that  as  we  lower  the  frequency  at which  we 
observe  data relative  to the  frequency  at which  consumption  decisions 
are made,  the model  looks more and more like a standard model without 
adjustment  delays.  In  standard  models  the  covariance  between  con- 
sumption  growth  and  stock  returns  divided  by horizon  increases  with 
horizon.  This feature is counterfactual; it is known  as the equity-premium 
puzzle at  long horizons and  is  documented  by  Cochrane  and  Hansen 
(1992). 
There is a long  list of variables  that successfully  predict stock returns 
in  (iii). The list includes  term spreads  (Campbell,  1987), the  dividend- 
earnings ratio (Lamont, 1996), and the consumption/wealth  ratio (Lettau 
and  Ludvigson,  2001).  I show  that  even  lagged  consumption  growth 
(which is a variable directly taken from the model)  is a predictor  (but of 
course  less successful  than other variables). 
In addition to these three problems,  the model may be relying on large 
and counterfactual  net borrowing  from "foreigners" (agents whose  con- 
sumption  is not  used  to define  aggregate  consumption)  to sustain  the 320 *  PIAZZESI 
exogenously  fixed low risk-free rate, but I have not looked  at the behav- 
ior of net borrowing. 
In the process  of documenting  the properties  of the model,  I also show 
that the  first three  autocorrelations  of consumption  growth  are signifi- 
cantly different from zero in the data. Moreover,  consumption  growth  is 
heteroscedastic  in  the  data.  For example,  a  Garch(l,l)  is  significant. 
These  two  properties  mean  that  consumption  growth  is  certainly  not 
i.i.d.,  an  assumption  often  made  by  recent  consumption-based  asset 
pricing models  (following  Hall, 1978). Heteroscedasticity  may be impor- 
tant for explaining  the  time  variation  in expected  returns which  is not 
captured in this paper. Models  that replicate this time variation typically 
rely on features of preferences  which  produce  time-varying  risk aversion 
(Campbell  and  Cochrane,  1999;  Barberis,  Huang,  and  Santos,  2001; 
Veronesi,  2001). 
I  also  show  that  the  cross-correlation  of  consumption  growth  and 
stock  returns data seems  to be seasonal.  This seasonality  appears  even 
though  the consumption  data are seasonally  adjusted.  At first sight this 
adjustment  looks successful,  because  the autocorrelation function of con- 
sumption  growth  does  not  show  any  obvious  seasonal  patterns.  The 
cross-moments  with  returns, however,  seem  to indicate that it may mat- 
ter for  stock  pricing  that  real-life  investors  are consuming  a seasonal 
consumption  process.  This raises the question  whether  the predictability 
of consumption  growth  is a feature of the data that should  be matched 
by an asset-pricing  model. 
The following  discussion  will thus  concentrate  on the autocorrelation 
and predictability  of consumption  growth,  the predictability  of returns, 
and the equity  premium  at long  horizons.  Here,  "consumption"  always 
refers to aggregate  consumption.  I will then  return to the interpretation 
of  adjustment  delays  in  terms  of  cognitive  costs  that is offered  in this 
paper and suggest  extensions. 
2.  Data  and  Calibration 
The  comparison  of  the  model  with  the  data  relies  on  two  series:  con- 
sumption  and  real stock  returns.  Consumption  is for nondurables  and 
services excluding  shoes  and clothing,  seasonally  adjusted in 1996 chain- 
weighted  dollars.  The  returns  are for all stocks  traded  on  NASDAQ, 
AMEX, and the NYSE. The calculation  of real returns relies on the con- 
sumer price index.  The sample  consists  of quarterly data from 1953:1 to 
2000:3. 
Since I use  different  consumption  and returns  data than the paper,  I 
also use  slightly  different parameter values  to calibrate the model: r +  Tr Comment  321 
=  0.08,  o  =  0.16,  y  =  4,  Di  =  4  or Di  =  10,  Vi. I assume  that  initial 
adjustment  times  i are uniformly  distributed  over [0,D]. 
3. Autocorrelation  of Consumption  Growth 
Figure 1 shows  the  autocorrelation  of consumption  growth  at different 
lags h together  with  95% confidence  bounds.  The autocorrelation  is sig- 
nificant up to the third quarter, which  means  that consumption  growth 
is definitely  not i.i.d.  The figure also shows  the autocorrelations  implied 
by  the  model  for D  =  4 and  D  =  10.  The  general  pattern  is  that  the 
autocorrelation  in a model with interval length  D between  two decisions 
dies off after D periods.  The autocorrelation  in the data seems  to be best 
matched  by choosing  D  =  4. The first two  autocorrelations  of 0.85 and 
0.57 produced  by the model  for D  =  4 are clearly too high  compared  to 
the data. 
As  an aside,  I would  like to add  that autocorrelation  is not  the  only 
dimension  in  which  consumption  growth  is  not  i.i.d.  Consumption 
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Table  1  MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD  ESTIMATES  OF A log ct = co + cl A log ct_1 
+  cA2  A  log  C2  +-  +  et 
Co  C1  C2  C3  a0  al  a2 
0.01  0.31  0.03  0.23  0.00  0.03  0.95 
(7.04)  (4.01)  (0.33)  (2.93)  (0.64)  (1.19)  (29.56) 
Here  Et  is conditionally  normal with  mean  0 and variance  0o  2  =  +  Cae_1  +  a20-.-  e estimation 
uses  quarterly data on U.S.  consumption  of nondurables  and services  without  shoes  and clothing  from 
1953:1 to 2000:3. t-statistics  are in brackets. 
growth  is also heteroscedastic,  a property  which  may be important  for 
explaining  the time variation in expected  returns (which  is not captured 
by  the  model).  This  can  be  seen  from  Table  1,  which  reports  the 
maximum-likelihood  estimates  of an AR(3) combined  with  a Garch(l,l). 
The estimate of the Garch parameter  a2  is 0.95 and is strongly  significant. 
The  autoregressive  parameters  are partial  correlations,  so  they  differ 
from Figure 1, which  shows  autocorrelations. 
4.  Equity  Premium  at Long  Horizons 
To see how  the model behaves  as we vary the observation  horizon  h for a 
fixed decision  interval length  D >  1, consider the following  equation that 
determines  the equity  premium  in the model: 
cov(log(ct+h+l/ct),log  R, t+h) 
T =  ? /?  6D.  (1) 
h 
Figure 2 shows  the covariance  factor on the right-hand  side of this equa- 
tion,  the  covariance  of consumption  growth  and  stock returns  divided 
by the horizon.  In the data, this covariance is hump-shaped  as a function 
of  horizon:  increasing  up  to  2 years  and  then  decreasing.  The  model 
predicts  a monotonically  increasing  covariance.  The reason is that as we 
lower  the observation  frequency  relative  to the decision  interval  length 
D,  the  model  behaves  more  and  more  like the  original  Merton  model 
without  adjustment  delays.  Therefore the model  predicts  a high  covari- 
ance of consumption  growth  and stock returns at long  horizons,  which 
is counterfactual. 
The  equity  premium  at long  horizons  was  noted  by  Cochrane  and 
Hansen  (1992)  and  was  seen  as  causing  a  problem  for  the  time- 
aggregation  literature because  aggregation  problems  matter less  as we 
lower  the  frequency  at  which  we  observe  the  data.  The  same  now 
applies  to a model  with  adjustment  delays.  Figure 2 does  not show  the Comment 323 
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standard  errors around  the  covariance  estimates,  which  get  large with 
horizon  to the  extent  that the  hump  in the  empirical  covariance  is not 
significant.  The  equity  premium,  however,  is not  much  of  a puzzle  if 
we  take into  account  standard  errors in this  case  (as can be  seen  from 
the cross-correlation  at h = 0 in Figure 5 below). 
5.  Predictability  of Consumption  Growth 
To look at the predictability  of consumption  with  stock returns,  Gabaix 
and Laibson compute  the cumulative  covariance  of log stock returns log 
Rt  t+  from time t to time t + 1 with consumption  growth log(ct+l+h/ct) from 
time t to time t +  1 + h, for different quarterly horizons  h. By decompos- 
ing this covariance  measure  into its individual  elements,  we  get 
c  (  Ct+h+l  )  h  co  Ct+i+l  o  cov  log 
--  , log  R, t+)=  cov  log  i--  ,log  Rt+l  . 
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From the last equation,  we  can see that this cumulative  covariance mea- 
sure  does  not  only  reflect  whether  stock  returns  predict  consumption 
growth,  because  part of the  covariance  is due  to the  contemporaneous 
covariance  cov(log(c,t+/ct), log R,,,,)  between  returns  and  consumption 
growth. 
Figure 3 plots  this cumulative  consumption  measure  (like Figure 7 in 
the paper),  while  Figure 4 plots  the individual  components  in the sum 
on  the  right-hand  side  of  the  last  equation.  Both figures  are based  on 
U.S.  data for nondurables  and services  instead  of the total consumption 
series  from different  countries  used  in the paper.  The dashed  lines  are 
95% confidence  bounds  based on Newey-West  standard errors. Figure 3 
shows  that  the  contemporanous  covariance  estimate  in  the  data  is  al- 
ready nonzero,  and then the covariance  measure  increases  up to 7 quar- 
ters.  Beyond  that,  the  covariance  slightly  decreases  with  horizon,  but 
confidence  bounds  become  large.  The figure  shows  that the covariance 
pattern in the data is well replicated by the model if the interval length  D 
between  decisions  is set to 4 quarters. 
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FIGURE  4 COVARIANCE  OF (Ct+l+h/Ct+h)  AND log Rt,t+l 
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The covariance  of the total consumption  data (used in the paper) with 
returns  seems  to  increase  with  horizon.  To replicate  this,  Gabaix and 
Laibson use a distribution  for D over [0,30] years to compute  the covari- 
ance measure from the model.  This is not necessary  for data on nondura- 
bles  and  services.  Section  6.2 of the paper  compares  Figure 7 with  the 
plain  Merton  model  with  i.i.d.  consumption  growth.  This is not  really 
an appropriate  comparison,  because  it is clear that a model  where  con- 
sumption  growth  is assumed  to be i.i.d.  does  not imply any predictabil- 
ity. Models  with  exogenous  returns  like Constantinides  (1990) tend  to 
produce  too  much  predictability,  and  so  they  provide  a more  natural 
benchmark. 
The individual  covariances in Figure 4 represent the slope of the cumu- 
lative covariance function in Figure 3. We can see that the slope is signifi- 
cant and positive  for horizons  1, 2, and 4, while  it becomes  negative  at 
horizon  8. This pattern looks  somewhat  seasonal,  even  though  the con- 
sumption  series  is  seasonally  adjusted.  This pattern  suggests  that  the 
covariance increase until h = 7 in Figure 3 may be due to seasonalities.  In 
20 326 *  PIAZZESI 
this  case,  it is not  clear whether  this  predictability  is a feature that the 
model  should  match. More generally, the pattern raises doubts about the 
use  of  seasonally  adjusted  data  for  tests  of  consumption-based  asset 
pricing models. 
6. Predictability  of Returns 
Stock returns can be predicted  with  a large number  of variables.  Figure 
5  shows  the  cross-correlation  between  current  consumption  growth 
log(ct+l/ct) and returns from time t + h to t + h +  1 for varying  horizons 
h  together  with  approximate  95% confidence  bounds  (computed  as 
?2-/T,  where  T is  the  number  of  observations  in  the  sample).  The 
pattern  of this cross-correlation  for h =  0,  -1,  -2,  -4,  -8  shows  again 
that the equity  premium  is measured  with  a lot of noise  (supposing  the 
standard Euler equation  holds)  and that consumption  growth  is predict- 
able  with  stock  returns  as  documented  in  Section  5.  The  interesting 
stylized  fact that emerges  from this graph is that the cross-correlation  is 
FIGURE 5 CROSS-CORRELATION OF log(ct+1/ct)  WITH log Rt,t+l+h 
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also  significant  at  h  =  4.  This  means  we  can  use  current  returns  to 
predict consumption  growth  one year from now. 
The model by Gabaix and Laibson is not consistent  with this feature of 
the  data,  because  it assumes  that these  returns  are i.i.d.  and  thus  not 
predictable.  Future  research  will  hopefully  show  whether  adjustment 
delays  can be combined  with something  else,  such as habit formation,  so 
that the extended  model  can capture this important  stylized  fact. 
7. Some  Evidence  about  Cognitive  Costs 
The paper  assumes  that agents  do not  receive  or process  stock-market 
informationbetween  any two periods. If this assumption  is a good descrip- 
tion of individual  behavior,  real net mutual-fund  inflows  should  react to 
past  stock return information.  To check this implication  of the model,  I 
collect monthly data on net inflows into stock funds from 1984:1 to 2001:2. 
These data can be obtained from the Web site of the Investment  Company 
Institute. Real inflows  are computed  based on the consumer price index. I 
also subtract a linear trend from the real inflows.  Figure 6 shows  that only 
FIGURE  6 CORRELATION  BETWEEN  Inflows(t)  AND log Rt_h,t-h+1 
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the contemporaneous  correlation between  real net inflows  and returns is 
significant,  not the correlation between  inflows  and past returns.  While 
this is certainly not conclusive  evidence  against cognitive  costs,  the graph 
still provides  some  evidence  that investors  do  not  react to past  return 
information  when  choosing  their portfolio. 
8. Extension  to General  Equilibrium 
The  riskless  rate  is  exogenous  in  this  model  and  therefore  does  not 
reveal  any  information  that  agents  have  who  have  only  recently  ad- 
justed their portfolio.  I doubt this feature of the model  will still be true in 
a closed-economy  version  where  the riskless  rate is allowed  to move  in 
response  to a stock-market  crash.  This version  is not  easy  to compute, 
but the wealth  distribution  matters even  without  idiosyncratic  shocks.  It 
would  be interesting  to link it to models  in the incomplete-market  litera- 
ture (e.g.,  Krusell and Smith,  1997) which  also try to increase individual 
consumption  volatility  like  Gabaix  and  Laibson,  but  with  a  different 
mechanism.  There is some  hope  that a combination  of the  two  will  be 
successful  at explaining  the equity-premium  puzzle. 
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Discussion 
David  Laibson admitted  that how  to fix D,  the length  of the period  be- 
tween  readjustments  of consumption,  is an important question,  and that 
one would  not expect everyone  in the economy  to have  the same D. He 
explained  that the assumption  of continuous  rebalancing was not a crucial 
one,  as it affected  only  second-order  terms.  He  was  very  receptive  to 
the  idea  that  some  important  financial  events  capture  people's  atten- 
tion.  An extension  to the model  to capture this phenomenon  through  a 
Poisson  arrival rate of important  events  affects the results  only  slightly. 
Laibson recognized  that dealing  with the long-horizon  evidence  was im- 
portant and suggested  that the picture would  look better using  interna- 
tional  data.  He  also said  that at long  horizons,  standard  errors become 
very large, so the evidence  neither supported  nor rejected the framework. 
Robert Barsky suggested  that if consumption  had to be committed  in 
advance,  the effects could be the same as when  investors  rebalance their 
portfolios  only  intermittently  because  of  cognitive  costs.  He  asked 
whether  the  model  could  deal  with  the  puzzle  that stocks  outperform 
bonds  over long periods.  Laibson agreed that cognitive  costs are just one 
possible  explanation  for delayed  adjustment.  He guessed  that the model 
had nothing  to say about the returns on stocks relative to bonds. 
David Romer suggested  that the authors should  look more carefully at 
the equity premium  over long rather than short horizons,  as their expla- 
nation  seemed  to have  an effect only  at short horizons.  He commented 
that even  if the model  failed to explain all of the puzzle  at long horizons, 
it was still a useful contribution.  He did not see why  there should  be one 
single  explanation  for the  entire  equity-premium  puzzle,  a view  with 
which  Laibson  was  sympathetic.  Romer also  said that the  fact that the 
equity  premium  had  fallen  in  recent  years  made  him  nervous  about 
theories  that predict  a premium  at all times  and  places.  Xavier Gabaix 
remarked that,  according  to recent  surveys,  it appears  that the public's 
expected  return  on  stocks  remains  high,  even  though  actual  returns 
have  fallen. 
Nobuhiro  Kiyotaki  suggested  that limited  participation  can arise en- 
dogenously  from the costs  of rebalancing  portfolios.  He suggested  that 
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the  authors  could  get  a sense  of  the  importance  of  cognitive  costs  by 
looking  at the size  of asset holdings  of participants  and nonparticipants 
in the stock market. 
Greg Mankiw was  struck by the fact that the model predicted  positive 
autocorrelation  of consumption  growth,  counter  to some  of the empiri- 
cal evidence.  Laibson responded  that he thought  the model  did reason- 
ably well  on this score.  Jim Stock said he would  like to see  an examina- 
tion of the temporal  aggregation  problem  in this context. 
Gertler suggested  that looking  at the standard deviation  of individual 
consumption  in  the  model  and  in  the  data  would  be  a good  way  of 
evaluating  the  empirical plausibility  of the model.  Laibson replied  that 
he believed  the jumps  in consumption  predicted  by the model  were of a 
reasonable  order of magnitude. 